Monday, 19 December 2022

Validity of Notice issued under section 148 of the Income Tax Act in the name of a deceased person

Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’ for short) provides that before making the assessment, reassessment or recomputation under section 147, the Assessing Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice requiring him to furnish within such period, as may be specified in the notice, a return of his income or the income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year corresponding to the relevant assessment year, in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if such return were a return required to be furnished under section 139.

The issuance of valid notice is a foundation for the valid assessment or re-assessment proceedings. The notice prescribed under section 148 is not a mere procedural requirement, but is a condition precedent to the validity of assessment or reassessment proceedings. If no notice is issued or if the notice issued is shown to be invalid, the proceedings initiated by the Assessing Officer would be invalid and void.

As a dead individual is not a person in the eyes of law, assessment or reassessment proceedings or subsequent proceedings taken in his name will be invalid. The Department must bring all the legal legal representatives on record and continue proceedings against them as required under and in accordance with section 159 of the Act. No assessment or reassessment proceedings or subsequent proceedings can be undertaken against a dead person. Framing assessment or reassessment proceedings on a non-existent person is a jurisdictional defect and cannot cured under section 292B or under section 292BB. For taking refuge under section 292BB the legal representatives or the assessee has to point out the defect in the notice or in its service during the course of assessment or reassessment proceedings.

Once the assessee is dead, no valid assessment or reassessment can be made on him by issuing notice under section 148 in the name of the deceased or framing assessment in his name. It is because on death of a person his legal personality ceases to exist and thereafter no order can be passed against such dead person. Thus, the assessment or reassessment in the hands of dead person is void. Therefore, for a valid reassessment of escaped income of the deceased, the Assessing Officer has to bring all the legal representatives on record and issue notices under section 148 to all.

Section 159 provides that any re- assessment proceeding taken against the deceased before his death may be continued against the legal representative from the stage at which it stood on the date of the death of the deceased and accordingly, all the provisions of this Act shall apply to that legal representative.

Section 292B also cannot cure jurisdictional defects:

Section 292B provides that no return of income, assessment, notice, summons or other proceedings shall not be invalid merely by reason of 'any mistake, defect, or omission. Section 292B of the Act was enacted to save purely technical obligations without substantially coming in the way of the validity of the assessment proceedings. Issue of a valid notice is a condition precedent for initiating proceedings under section 148 of the Income-tax Act. If it is issued on a dead person it will be illegal and without jurisdiction which cannot be saved by section 292B of the Act.

Operation of Section 292BB in cases of issue of notice under section 148(1)/making assessment or reassessment on a dead person

Section 292BB prohibits an assessee in any enquiry or proceedings, to raise the plea of non-service, untimely service or improper service of a notice, if he has participated in the assessment or reassessment proceedings and such objection has not been raised before completion such assessment or reassessment proceedings. This Section was inserted by Finance Act 2018 w.e.f. 01.04.2008 and, thus, will not be applicable for earlier assessment years. Also, where the LR raises the plea of non-service of the notice before completion of reassessment, main provision cannot be invoked to correct the error. Further, the issuance and service of the notice under section 148(1) is jurisdictional aspect and therefore, a defect in the notice cannot be cured under section 292BB.

Assessing Officer issued notice under section 148 to assessee to file return on 31.03.2021 and writ applicant, legal representative of assessee, had informed about death of assessee on 22.11.2020, since writ applicant had not surrendered to jurisdiction of Assessing Officer by submitting return in response to impugned notice and Assessing Officer had not issued notice to him as legal representative representing estate of deceased assessee, impugned notice issued by Assessing Officer was invalid and should be quashed

The High Court has drawn distinction between clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 159 and clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 159. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 159 permits initiation of any proceedings, which could have been taken against the deceased through legal representative. However, in the instant case, the impugned notice dated 31.03.2021 under section 148hasbeenissued upon the deceased assessee, who had expired prior to the issuance of such notice. The instant case does not fall under clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 159 and in such circumstances, even the proceedings pursuant to such notices as sought to be initiated by the Assessing Officer cannot be continued upon the deceased assessee.

Assessing Officer issued a notice under section 148 on 31.03.2021 to assessee calling upon to him file return of income. Writ-applicant, son of assessee, responded to said notice by submitting that assessee had died on 22.11.2020 and prayed for quashing of said notice and, further, requested to drop proceeding. However, Assessing Officer issued notice under section 142(1) again in name of deceased assessee.

In the peculiar facts and circumstances as emerged from the records, more particularly upon perusal of the contents of the objections-cum-reply filed by the writ-applicant dated 10.04.2021 and 15.12.2021, it transpires that he has not surrendered to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer by submitting return in response to the impugned notices neither the jurisdictional Assessing Officer has issued notice upon writ-applicant as legal representative representing estate of deceased assessee. Thus, it is to be held that the proceeding initiated by the Assessing Officer against the deceased assessee was not tenable in the eye of law and was required to be quashed and set aside. In the result, the impugned notice was invalid and does not confer jurisdiction upon the Assessing Officer to proceed against the writ applicant. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2015-16) – [Kanubhai Dhirubhai Patel v. ITO (2022) 444 ITR 405 : 139 taxmann.com 580 (Guj.)]

Assessing Officer issued notice under section 148 against a dead person, impugned notice was null and void and required to be set aside

Petitioner herein is the son of Late Mr. Amrit SinghThapar, the deceased assessee, who expired on 2-8-2020. It is the case of the Petitioner that impugned notice dated 6-4-2021 was issued by Respondent No. 1 stating therein that income chargeable to tax for the assessment year 2013-14 had escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147 of the Act and 30 days were granted to file a return in the prescribed form. Soon thereafter vide an email dated 30-4-2021, Petitioner's mother, i.e., the wife of the deceased assessee informed Respondent No. 1 of the demise of her husband and also sent the Death Certificate. Despite the said intimation, the revenue authorities issued further notices to the deceased assessee, including one under Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, pursuant to an order passed by the Supreme Court. Against the notices issued by the revenue authorities, the petitioner Davinder Singh Thapar, i.e., the son of the deceased assessee, filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court.

 

The petitioner Davinder Singh Thapar submitted before the High Court that the notices issued by the revenue department against the assessee were invalid in law since they were issued against a dead person. The petitioner averred that under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, there is a statutory requirement that the Assessing Officer shall serve a notice on the assessee. The petitioner contended that since the assessee had expired prior to the issuance of the first notice, the said statutory requirement was not fulfilled.

 

The petitioner submitted that the Delhi High Court in the case of Savita Kapila versus ACIT, (2020) had held that a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act against a dead person is null and void and, therefore, all consequential proceedings and orders are invalid.

 

The revenue department averred that notices were issued against the deceased assessee pursuant to an order passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal (2022) 286 Taxman 183 : 138 taxmann.com 64 (SC).

 

The Court observed that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. v.  Ashish Agarwal (2022) did not deal with the issue of whether the notices could be issued against the assesses who had expired. However, on a pointed query by the Court as to whether the judgment deals with the issue if notices can be issued in cases where the assessees have expired, the answer was in the negative.

 

The Court noted that the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Sangeeta Vig versus ITO, Delhi (2022), after referring to the decision rendered in Savita Kapila v. ACIT (2020) 426 ITR 502 : 273 Taxman 148 : 118 taxmann.com 46 (Del.) had set aside an order passed under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act against a deceased assessee.

 

The Court observed that the case of the assessee was covered by the judgments of the Delhi High Court. Accordingly, the impugned notices are hereby quashed and set aside. Needless to state that it is open to the Respondents to take such steps as may be permitted in law and if and when such steps are taken, with which the Petitioner is aggrieved, it would be open to the Petitioner to resort to the remedies in accordance with law. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2013-14) - [ACIT v. Davinder Singh Thapar (2022) 141 taxmann.com 4 (ITAT Delhi)]

Petitioner, legal representative, challenged impugned notice issued under section 148 on ground that notice had been issued in name of his deceased father, revenue was to be directed to issue appropriate notice to petitioner under section 148 as a legal representative of deceased assessee

I am inclined to allow this writ petition at the stage of admission by giving liberty to the respondent to issue appropriate notice to the petitioner under section 148 as a legal representative of the deceased assessee, namely, Jeyachandran. The time spent in the impugned proceeding till the date of receipt of this order shall be excluded. Considering the fact that the time for completing the assessment would expire on 31.03.2022, the respondent is given liberty to issue a fresh notice to the petitioner within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. The respondent shall thereafter proceed to pass appropriate orders on merits and in accordance with law within a period of 75 days. The entire exercise shall be completed by the respondent within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Therefore, where petitioner, legal representative challenged impugned notice dated 29.03.2021 issued under section 148 on ground that notice had been issued in name of his father who died on 17.01.2014, revenue was to be directed to issue appropriate notice to petitioner under section 148 as a legal representative of deceased assessee. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year :  2015-16) – [J. Kishorekumar v. ITO (2022) 139 taxmann.com 47 (Mad.)]

Legal representatives of deceased not obliged to intimate death to Income tax department & get PAN cancelled

It is the case of the petitioner, that Late Shri Gupta had, however, expired on 17.06.2014 and in support of this submission, the petitioner has placed on record the Death Certificate of Late Shri Gupta issued by the Department of Public Health, Corporation of Chennai.

Delhi High Court quashed reopening notice as well as reassessment order & all consequential proceedings initiated in the name of deceased & also held, interalia, that the Legal representatives of deceased are not obliged to intimate death to Income tax department & get PAN cancelled & that reassessment order can be challenged in such cases in writ petition. (Related Assessment year : 2012-13) - [Sripathi Subbaraya Manohara L/H Late Sripathi Subbaraya Gupta v. PCIT - Date of Judgement : 14.07.2021 (Del.)]

Reassessment of deceased assessee’s legal heirs, invalid sans procedure under section 159, incurable u/nder section 292B

Karnataka High Court allows writ petition challenging initiation of reassessment against legal heirs where notice under section 148 was issued in the name of deceased Assessee; Assessee, late Mr. Kurkal Gopal Shetty passed away 2014 whereas a notice under section 148 for Assessment year 2011-12 dated 23.03.2018 was issued to him; During the course of assessment proceedings, Revenue was informed of the Assessee’s demise whereafter Revenue issued notices under section 142(1) to the legal heirs and passed an ex parte reassessment order; Legal heirs challenged the validity of reassessment notice, reassessment order and consequential recovery and penalty notices; High Court observes that legal heirs received the notice under section 142(1) but no fresh notice under section 148 was issued to them; High Court further observes that the notice to the deceased Assessee is invalid from its inception as the the only remedy available to the Revenue against a dead person is to issue notice to the legal representatives under section 159, and except this procedure no other procedure has been envisaged in law; High Court relies on the Madras High Court ruling in Alamelu Veerappan v. ITO (2018) 257 Taxman 72 : 95 taxmann.com 155 (Mad.) wherein it was held that “notice issued to the legal representatives beyond the period of limitation prescribed is without jurisdiction and unenforceable in law” and notes that Delhi High Court ruling in Rajender Kumar Sehgal v. ITO (2019) 414 ITR 286 : 260 Taxman 412 : 101 taxmann.com 233 (Del.) is also on the similar lines; Refers to Section 292B and holds that the notice issued against a dead person ought to have been issued under Section 159(2)(b) to the legal representatives and such notice cannot be saved by recourse to Section 292B; Relying on the Supreme Court ruling in CIT v. Kurban Hussain Ibrahimji Mithiborwala (1971) 82 ITR 821 (SC), High Court remarks that the position of law on validity of the notice vitiating the pursuant proceedings is well-settled and thus, sets aside the reassessment order and consequential demand and penalty notices. [In favour of assessee][Vanitha Gopal Shetty v. ACIT [TS-646-HC-2021(KAR)] – Date of Judgement : 05.07.2021 (Karn.)]

In absence of a statutory provision, a duty cannot be cast upon legal representatives to intimate factum of death of assessee to department and, thus, where Assessing Officer issued a notice to assessee under section 148 after his death and, in such a case, it could not have been validly served upon assessee, said notice being invalid, was to be quashed

An information was received by Assessing Officer that assessee had deposited certain amount in his bank account source of which was not explained. Assessing Officer thus issued a notice to asseessee under section 148 seeking to reopen assessment - Petitioner i.e. legal representative of assessee filed instant petition challenging validity of said notice by contending that it was issued subsequent to death of assessee and, thus, statutory requirement of service of notice had not been fulfilled. In absence of a statutory provision, a duty cannot be cast upon legal representatives to intimate factum of death of assessee to department. Therefore, question as to whether PAN record was updated or not or whether department was made aware by legal representatives or not is irrelevant. In view of aforesaid legal position and, having regard to fact that impugned notice could not have been served upon assessee, same deserved to be quashed. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2012-13) – [Savita Kapila v. ACIT (2020) 426 ITR 502 : 273 Taxman 148 : 118 taxmann.com 46 (Del.)]

Petitioner, a widow of original assessee, produced death certificate of her deceased husband, which indicated that notice under section 148 was issued against a dead person, impugned notice was invalid and was to be set aside

This Petition is filed by the widow of Late Shri Shyamsundar Pundalik Dhumatkar. Late Shri Shyamsundar Dhumatkar was engaged in his individual business. He filed return of his income till the year 2007-08. According to Petitioner, however, since thereafter he had no taxable income, he had stopped filing returns of income. The Assessing Officer issued a notice dated 27.03.2018 in the name of Late Shri Shyamsundar Dhumatkar under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Act’) reopening the assessment for the assessment year 2011-12. Shri Shyamsundar Pundalik Dhumatkar expired on 14.10.2016. Thus, the notice dated 27.03.2018 was issued on a dead person. The Petitioner as a widow and legal heir of the deceased Shri Shyamsundar Dhumatkar brought these facts to the notice of the income tax department. Despite this, the Assessing Officer issued a notice under section 142(1) of the Act on 29.08.2018 and therefore the Petitioner has filed this Petition challenging the said notice dated 27.03.2018.

The facts are not seriously in dispute. The Petitioner had produced the death certificate of Shri Shyamsundar Dhumatkar before the Income-tax authorities, indicating that he died on 14/10/2016. Thus, the impugned notice of reopening of assessment was issued on a dead person. There are several judgments of different High Courts holding that the notice or reopening of assessment is invalid in law. A reference in this respect can be made to a decision of Gujarat High Court in the case of Chandreshbhai Jayantibhai Patel v. ITO (2019) 413 ITR 276 : 261 Taxman 137 : 101 taxmann.com 362 (Guj.). As also the decision of Madras High Court in the case of Alamelu Veerappan v. ITO (2018) 257 Taxman 72 : 95 taxmann.com 155 (Mad.). It is not necessary to refer to all the judgments on the point. Suffice it to say, as per the settled law, notice for reopening of assessment against a dead person is invalid. In the result, the impugned notice is set aside. Petition is disposed of accordingly. Consequentially, the order of assessment dated 31.12.2018 also stands annulled. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2011-12) - [Rupa Shyamsundar Dhumatkar (2020) 420 ITR 256 :  275 Taxman 453 : 120 taxmann.com 323 (Bom.)]

Notice seeking to reopen assessment was issued in name of deceased assessee, since she could not have participated in reassessment proceedings, provisions of section 292BB were not applicable to assessee’s case and as a consequence, impugned reassessment proceedings deserved to be quashed

For relevant year, assessee filed her return declaring certain taxable income. Return was processed in a routine manner and assessee was intimated about it. After death of assessee, Assessing Officer issued a notice under section 148 in her name seeking to reopen assessment. Legal representative of assessee filed instant petition contending that Act did not provide any mechanism for issuing and carrying on reassessment in respect of a dead person, if reassessment notice was issued against a deceased. Revenue, on other hand, raised a plea that error in issuing notice to a non-existent person or entity was capable of correction by reason of section 292BB. On facts, if original assessee had lived and later participated in proceedings, then, by reason of section 292BB, she would have been precluded from saying that no notice was factually served upon her. However, in instant case, since notice was issued in name of assessee when she was no longer alive, it was inconceivable that she could have participated in reassessment proceedings to be estopped from contending that she did not receive it. Therefore, provisions of section 292BB were not applicable to assessee’s case and as a consequence, impugned reassessment proceedings deserved to be quashed. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2010-11) – [Rajender Kumar Sehgal v. ITO (2019) 414 ITR 286 : 260 Taxman 412 : 101 taxmann.com 233 (Del.)]

Assessing Officer had issued notice under section 148 in name of deceased assessee to reopen his assessment, for acquiring jurisdiction to reopen an assessment, notice should be issued in name of living person, i.e., legal heir of deceased assessee and section 292B could not be invoked to correct a fundamental/substantial error

The Assessing Officer issued a notice dated 29.03.2018 under section 148 in the name of the dead person, i.e., the deceased assessee [B] to reopen his assessment for the assessment year 2011-12. The petitioner, who was the registered legal heir of ‘B’, challenged the impugned notice on the ground that it was without jurisdiction. The Assessing Officer by order dated 13.11.2018 rejected the petitioner's preliminary objection inter alia on the ground that the defect in the notice would stand rectified by virtue of section 292B. On writ:

The issue of a notice under section 148 is a foundation for reopening of assessment. The sine qua non for acquiring jurisdiction to reopen an assessment is that such notice should be issued in the name of the correct person. This requirement of issuing notice to a correct person and not to a dead person is not merely a procedural requirement but is a condition precedent to the impugned notice being valid in law. Thus a notice which has been issued in the name of the dead person is also not protected either by provisions of section 292B or section 292BB. This is so as the requirement of issuing a notice in the name of correct person is the foundational requirement to acquire jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. This is evident from section 148, which requires that before a proceeding can be taken up for reassessment, a notice must be served upon the assessee. The assessee on whom the notice must be sent must be a living person, i.e., legal heir of the deceased assessee, for the same to be responded. This in fact is the intent and purpose of the Act. Therefore, section 292B cannot be invoked to correct a foundational/substantial error as it is meant so as to meet the jurisdictional requirement. Therefore, both the impugned notice dated 29.03.2018 and the impugned order dated 13.11.2018 required to be quashed and set aside. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2011-12) – [Sumit Balkrishna Gupta v. ACIT (2019) 414 ITR 292 : 262 Taxman 61 : 103 taxmann.com 188 (Bom.)]

Proceedings were initiated against deceased assessee, notice issued on deceased person could not make legal heirs binding unless proper notice was issued on legal heirs - Any notice issued in name of deceased person was invalid and could not be enforced in law

The Assessing Officer issued notice under section 148 in the name of a dead person who had expired in 2009. Notice was received by the legal heir/wife of the assessee. The legal heir replied to the Assessing Officer stating that her husband expired in 2009 and did not furnish the return of income. On the ground that there was no compliance for the notice under section 148, the Assessing Officer completed the assessment under section 144, read with section 147, in the name of the legal heir. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed order of the Assessing Officer.

In the instant case before the Tribunal, the legal heir contended that issuance of notice on dead person and the consequent assessment order made in her name was invalid as the Assessing Officer proceeded to complete the assessment in the name of the legal heir without issuing notice under section 148.

The assessee expired on 03.11.2009. In support, death certificate was also enclosed in the paper book. Subsequent to the death of the assessee, reassessment proceedings were initiated and the notice under section 148 was issued in the name of the dead person. In response to the notice issued by the Assessing Officer, the wife of the deceased had intimated the death of the assessee. However, no effort was made by the Assessing Officer to bring the legal heir on record; instead, the Assessing Officer proceeded to complete the assessment in the name of the legal heir without issuing notice under section 148.

In the instant case, the proceedings were initiated against the dead person after the death of the assessee; hence the notice issued on the dead person could not make the legal heirs binding unless a proper notice was issued on the legal heirs. After the death of the assessee, proceedings must be initiated against the legal heirs to treat the legal heirs as deemed assessees. As per section 159 (2)(b), the Assessing Officer is free to initiate proceedings against the legal representatives which could have been initiated against the deceased and determine the tax liability of the deceased person and the same is binding on the Legal representatives. Any notice issued in the name of a deceased person is invalid and cannot be enforced in the law. The Madras High Court in the case of Alamelu Veerappan v. ITO (2018) 257 Taxman 72 : 95 taxmann.com 155 (Mad.) has held that the notice issued on a dead person is invalid and cannot be enforced.

It was further held that the date when the notice was issued, the assessee was already dead and if the Department intended to proceed under section 147, it could have done so prior to expiry of period of limitation by issuing the notice to the legal heirs of the deceased and beyond that date, it could not have proceeded in the matter even by issuing notice to the legal representatives of the assessee. It was further held that even if the provisions of section 159 are attracted, in that case also, the notice was required to be issued against and in the name of the heirs of the deceased assessee and under the said circumstances, section 159 shall not be of any assistance to the revenue.

The Bombay High Court in the case of Sumit Balkrishna Gupta v. ACIT (2019) 262 Taxman 61 : 103 taxmann.com 188 (Bom.) held that the notice issued on a dead person is invalid unenforceable in law. It was further held that a notice which has been issued in the name of the person is also not protected either by provisions of section 292B or 292BB the requirement of issuing a notice in the name of correct person is the foundational requirement to acquire jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. This is evident from section 148, which requires that before a proceeding can be taken up for reassessment, a notice must be served upon the assessee. The assessee on whom the notice must be sent must be a living person i.e, legal heir of the deceased assessee, for the same to be responded. Thus, the notice under section 148 on a dead person was invalid and accordingly, quashed. Consequent assessments made under section 144, read with section 147, is to be annulled. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2007-08) - [Aemala Venkateswara Rao v. ITO, Guntur (2019) 176 ITD 431 : 105 taxmann.com 14 (ITAT Visakhapatnam)]

Assessee did not inherit anything from his father and, moreover, he had nothing to do with his father's bank account, having regard to provisions of section 159, impugned assessment order passed under section 144, read with section 147 on ground that there were huge deposits in said account in relevant year prior to death of his father, was not sustainable

Liability of a legal representative under Act is limited to extent to which estate is capable of meeting said liability. Therefore, where assessee did not inherit anything from his father and, moreover, he had nothing to do with his father’s bank account, impugned assessment order passed under section 144, read with section 147, on ground that there were huge deposits in said account in relevant year prior to death of his father, was not sustainable and, thus, same deserved to be set aside. [In favour of assessee] – [C. Naveen Kumar v. ITO (2019) 266 Taxman 74 : 108 taxmann.com 219 (Mad.)]

Initiation of reassessment proceedings, in absence of service of notices under section 148 on all LRs of deceased assessee was bad in law, being void ab initio

Deceased assessee was survived by two sons and one daughter as her Legal Representatives (LRs) - After expiry of assessee, proceedings were initiated under section 148. Assessing Officer, however, issued notice to only one son ‘P’ who participated in reassessment proceedings. Subsequently, ‘P’ raised an objection before Commissioner (Appeals) that since notice was not served on all legal representatives, reassessment proceedings were invalid. Commissioner (Appeals) rejected said objection holding that once ‘P’ voluntarily participated in reassessment proceedings, he could not take a stand at appellate stage that notice was not served upon all legal heirs.

It would also be pertinent to notice here the provisions of section 159(4) of the Act, as per which, the personal liability of every LR for any tax payable by him in his capacity as such LR, if he creates a charge on or disposes of or parts with any asset of the estate of the deceased, shall be limited to the value of the asset so charged, dispose of or parted with. This is entirely in consonance with the requirement of serving reassessment notices on all the LRs of a deceased assessee, so as to enable a complete representation of the estate of the deceased in order to make the recovery of the liability fruitful and to enable the passing of an order effective to realize the entire sum due from the deceased assessee. The rights and interest of the LRs in the estate of the deceased cannot be taken away from them without giving them a proper opportunity of defending their rights and interest, in accordance with the natural justice principle of audi alterem partem, as held in ITO v. Umedram (1995) 54 ITD 191 (ITAT Jaipur). Therefore, initiation of reassessment proceedings, in absence of service of notices under section 148 on all LRs of deceased assessee was bad in law, being void ab initio. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2008-09) – [Shanta Kapoor v. ACIT, Agra (2018) 93 taxmann.com 226 (ITAT Agra)]

Revenue can not compel legal-heir to participate in deceased's re-assessment; Death non-intimation irrelevant

Madras High Court allows petitioner's (deceased assessee’s spouse) writ, quashes re-assessment notice issued under section 148 in the name of deceased-assessee, holds that petitioner cannot be compelled to participate in the proceedings and respond to Section 148 notice; In response to Section 148 notice issued in the name of assessee (within prescribed time-limit), petitioner intimated about assessee’s death and the subsequent notice was issued by Revenue beyond the limitation period; High Court remarks that merely because the Department was not intimated about the death of the assessee, that cannot, by itself, extend the period of limitation prescribed under the Statute.”, also clarifies that the issue relating to limitation is not a curable defect for the Revenue to invoke Section 292B; Further notes that Revenue could not show that there is a statutory obligation on the part of the legal representatives to immediately intimate the death of the assessee or take steps to cancel the PAN registration; Moreover, rules that proceedings under section 159 can be invoked only if the proceedings have already been initiated when assessee was alive and was permitted for the proceedings to be continued as against the legal heirs, however, observes that in present facts, Section 159 is not applicable, relies on Delhi High Court rulings in Vipin Walia v. ITO (2016) 382 ITR 19 : 238 Taxman 1 : 67 taxmann.com 56 : (2017) 295 CTR 505 (Del.) and Spice Entertainment Ltd., distinguishes Revenue’s reliance on Delhi High Court ruling in Sky Light Hospitality LLP on facts. [In favour of assesse] (Related Assessment year : 2010-11) [Alamelu Veerappan v. ITO [TS-315-HC-2018(MAD)] – Date of Judgement : 07.06.2018 (Mad.)]

Department intended to proceed under section 147 against assessee when he was already dead, it could have been done so by issuing a notice to legal representative of assessee within period of limitation for issuance of notice

Notice under section 148 for relevant assessment year was issued upon original assessee when he was already dead. However, department continued with proceedings under section 147 in name of petitioner, as a legal heir of original assessee. Petitioner contended that proceedings initiated were barred by limitation. If department intended to proceed under section 147, it could have been done so prior to period of limitation by issuing a notice to legal representative of deceased assessee and beyond that date it could not have proceeded in matter even by issuing notice to Legal Representatives of assessee, therefore, subsequent proceedings under section 147 against petitioner were wholly misconceived and were to be quashed. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year :2008-09) - [Vipin Walia v. ITO (2016) 382 ITR 19 : 238 Taxman 1 : 67 taxmann.com 56 : (2017) 295 CTR 505 (Del.)]

Original assessee, namely, ‘B’ died on 02.12.2009 and after a period of six years Assessing Officer issued notice under section 148 in her name to reopen assessment for assessment year 2009-10 and further despite pointing out by heir of ‘B’ that ‘B’ had expired long back, he relying upon section 159 continued with reassessment proceedings against ‘B’, section 159 would not applicable to instant case and, therefore impugned notice was liable to be set aside

Original assessee, namely, ‘B’ died on 02.12.2009. After a period of six years, Assessing Officer issued a notice under section 148 in name of ‘B’ to reopen assessment for assessment year 2009-10.  Thereupon petitioner-heir and legal representative of ‘B’ informed Assessing Officer that ‘B’ had already expired on 02.12.2009 and, therefore, notice in her name was not valid. Despite it, Assessing Officer relying upon section 159 informed petitioner to file return of income for assessment year 2009-10 and continued with reassessment proceedings against ‘B’. Even if section 159 relied upon by Assessing Officer was attracted in instant case, in that case also, notice under section 148 was required to be issued against and in name of heir of ‘B’. Under circumstances section 159 shall not be any assistance to Assessing Officer. Therefore, impugned notice issued under section 148 was liable to be set aside. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2009-10) – [Rasid Lala v. ITO (2017) 77 taxmann.com 39 (Guj.)]

Notice under section 148 was addressed to an assessee who was already dead even on date of issue of notice and notice was not served upon legal representatives of deceased but it was served on munim, defect in such notice was not cured by section 292B and as such notice was not valid

In the case of CIT v. Shital Prasad Kharag Prasad (2006) 280 ITR 541, a Division Bench of this court has held that the notice contemplated under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is a jurisdictional notice and is not curable under section 292B of the Act, if it was not served in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

In the present case, the notice under section 148 was addressed to an assessee who was already dead even on the date of issue of notice. The notice was issued on 28.03.1985, while the assessee, Ganga Prasad Jaiswal had died on 20.03.1985. The notice was not served upon the legal representatives of Ganga Prasad Jaiswal but it was served on one Keshav Ram, munim. Even the name of the deceased assessee was not correctly mentioned in the notice. The notice was addressed to Ganga Prasad Jaiswal while the correct name of the assessee was Ganga Ram Jaiswal.

Where the notice under section 148 was addressed to an assessee who was already dead even on the date of issue of notice and the notice was not served upon the legal representatives of the deceased but it was served on munim, the defect in such notice was not cured by section 292B and as such the notice was not valid. [In favour of assessee] – [CIT v. Suresh Chandra Jaiswal (2010) 325 ITR 563 (All.)]

Non-service of notice upon all legal representatives of deceased-assessee, is an irregularity which is curable and not an illegality sufficient for annulling assessment or reassessment proceedings

The assessee filed return for the assessment year 1992-93, declaring an income. The returns were processed under section 143(1A). Thereafter, the assessee passed away. A notice under section 148 was issued to the appellant, the legal representative of the deceased-assessee which was served upon him proposing to reopen assessment for relevant assessment years. The appellant appeared before the Assessing Officer through his chartered accountant and furnished the requisite explanations. There-after, reassessment orders were passed by the Assessing Officer for the relevant assessment years determining the income of the deceased- assessee. On appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals), the appellant, inter alia, contended that since a notice had not been issued to the other legal heirs left behind by the deceased-assessee, namely, his widow, sons and daughter, the orders of reassessment made by the Assessing Officer were illegal and unsustainable. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the contention of the appellant and annulled the reassessment orders. On revenue’s appeal, the Tribunal held that non-service of notice upon all the legal representatives of the deceased-assessee was an irregularity which was curable and not an illegality sufficient for annulling the assessment or reassessment proceedings. On appeals :

Held : The Tribunal had correctly held that the matter stood authoritatively concluded by the judgment of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Jai Prakash Singh (1996) 219 ITR 737 : 85 Taxman 407 (SC). The Apex Court in the said case held that non-issue of notices to other legal representatives of the deceased-assessee was not sufficient to avoid the assessment or reassessment orders made by the Assessing Officer. In the light of the said decision, the Commissioner was indeed in error in upsetting the reassessment orders passed by the Assessing Officer.

In the light of what had been stated above, no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The appeal failed and was, accordingly, dismissed. (Related Assessment years : 1992-93 and 1993-94) -[Shahid Atiq v. CIT (2006) 200 CTR 451 : 152 Taxman 71 (Del.)]

Notice of reassessment proceedings was served on four sons of deceased assessee - One of sons filed returns and pursued matter till passing of reassessment orders - At no stage, he objected to reassessment proceedings on ground that two of legal representatives of deceased had not been given notice – On facts, respondent - Legal representatives did not have locus standi to question orders of reassessment on ground of lack of notice to other legal representatives and appellate authority gravely erred in quashing reassessment orders only on ground that notice had not been given to remaining legal representatives - Further non-issuance of notice to some of legal heirs of deceased was merely an irregularity which did not affect validity of reassessment orders

For the assessment years 1979-80, 1985-86 and 1986-87, the Assessing Officer completed the assessment under section 143(1). Later on, he received information that the deceased had large deposits in banks which had not been properly explained. He then initiated reassessment proceedings for all these years and issued notices under section 148. The notices were duly served on all the legal heirs of the deceased. One of his sons, ‘H’ contested the notices. The Assessing Officer reassessed the income on deceased. The appeals filed by ‘H’ and three others were allowed by the Commissioner (Appeals) on the ground that notices of reassessment proceedings had not been given to two of the legal heirs of the deceased. Further appeals filed by the revenue were dismissed by the Tribunal. On reference :

Held : The notice of reassessment proceedings was served on four sons of the deceased. One of them, namely ‘H’, filed the returns without raising any objection. He pursued the matter till the passing of the orders. At no stage, he objected to reassessment proceedings on the ground that two of the legal representatives of the deceased had not been given notice. In this view of the matter, the legal representatives did not have the locus standi to question the orders of reassessment on the ground of lack of notice to other legal representatives and the appellate authority gravely erred in quashing the reassessment orders only on the ground that the notice had not been given to the remaining legal representatives. For the same reason, the order passed by the Tribunal was liable to be declared as vitiated by an error of law.

Further, non-issuance of notice to some of the legal heirs of the deceased was merely an irregularity and the same did not affect the validity of the reassessment orders. [In favour of the revenue] (Related Assessment years : 1979-80, 1985-86 and 1986-87) – [CIT v. Hukam Singh (2005) 276 ITR 347 : 198 CTR 92 (P&H)]

A notice under section 148 was issued upon original assessee when he was no more – Thereafter, department issued notice of demand under section 221(1) calling upon him to show cause as to why penalty should not be imposed for non-payment of dues – Notice under section 148 could not have been served upon deceased – Since department had not placed any material to show that notice under section 148 was served on petitioner, it could be said that notice was not served on him – Therefore, subsequent proceedings were bad in law as there was breach of principles of natural justice as well as mandatory provisions contained under section 148 – Therefore, notice of demand, notice under section 221(1) as also order of assessment and order of penalty were to be quashed

A notice under section 148 was issued in the name of the original assessee when he was no more. Thereafter, a notice of demand under section 156 was issued in the name of the petitioner, as a legal heir of original assessee, for the assessment year 1996-97. A notice under section 221(1), was also issued calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why a penalty should not be imposed for non-payment of the dues. On writ :

Held : Obviously, the notice could not have been served upon the deceased. Moreover, there was nothing on record to show that the notice under section 148 was served on the petitioner either. The revenue had submitted that section 148 mandated service of the notice on the assessee, however, in view of section 2(7) read with section 159(2)(b), the petitioner, being a legal representative of the deceased, would be deemed to be an assessee. However, nothing was placed before the High Court to show that any notice was served even on the deemed assessee. As such, it was clear that notice under section 148 was neither served on the original assessee nor on the deemed assessee. Therefore, the subsequent proceedings were bad in law as there was breach of the principles of natural justice as well as the mandatory provisions contained in section 148. The principle of audi alteram ought to have been followed by the revenue. Therefore, the notice of demand, the notice under section 221(1) as also the order of assessment and the order of penalty were to be quashed. In other words, all proceedings, notices, orders pursuant to the said notice under section 148 were quashed and set aside. The writ petitions were accordingly, allowed. [In favour of the assessee] (Related Assessment year : 1996-97) -

Notice under section 148 was served on one of seven legal heirs of deceased assessee, assumption of jurisdiction under section 147/148 by Assessing Officer was bad in law and assessment completed on basis of such a notice was ab initio void

As a consequence of search operations, a notice under section 148 was served on ‘BP’, one of the legal heirs of deceased assessee. Certain other letters in regard to certain enquiries as also certain notices were issued subsequently in the names of legal heirs which included BP, LN and LD. After the notices were sent under section 148, various additions were made by the Assessing Officer. On appeal, the appellant contended that initiation of proceedings under section 148 was bad in law inasmuch as the notice was issued in the name of one legal heir only and was not issued to all the legal heirs as required under the provisions of law and, consequently, the assessment so completed on the basis of certain notices issued under section 148 was void ab initio. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the contention of the assessee and held that the assessment being void ab initio stood annulled. On revenue’s appeal :

Held : If the said irregularity was cured, as on the date of the judgment, the Assessing Officer was not competent to issue notice under section 148 to other legal heirs because of the provisions of section 149, and as such, by no means estate could be represented on the basis of notice issued under section 148 to ‘BP’, who was also stated to have expired long back. In these circumstances, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer under section 147/148 was bad in law. The defect of not sending notices to all the legal representatives was not curable under the Act. The issue of notices under sections 142(1) and 142(2) is entirely on the different footing. The processing of the returns under section 143(3) simpliciter and the one processed under section 148 after assuming jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings are totally different. The assumption of jurisdiction is a very important step under the Act, which is based on certain happenings; whereas the proceedings under section 142(1)/142(2) are quite procedural and ordinary. The proceedings under section 147/148 affect the rights of the assessee. There was no infirmity in the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals). [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 1988-89) -  [ACIT v. Mangi Lal (2004) 83 TTJ 590 : 4 SOT 130 (ITAT Jodhpur)]

As against seven legal heirs of deceased assessee assessment proceedings were initiated only against ‘A’, who attended same and never objected to proceedings before Assessing Officer and never took plea for impleading all legal heirs, it would be wrong to hold proceedings to be void ab initio on ground that notice was issued to one legal heir only - Assessing Officer was rightly directed in such a case to re-process matter but after bringing other legal heirs on record

For the assessment years 1983-84 to 1985-86, the interest income on FDRs was assessed under section 147 read with section 143. On appeal, the assessee took the plea, inter alia that notices having been served on only one out of seven legal heirs, assessments framed were invalid and required to be annulled. The appellate authority, however, without annulling the assessments, restored the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer asking him to make enquiries for ascertaining the legal heirs so that notices could be issued to all of them.

On second appeal, the Accountant Member noted that out of seven legal heirs, only one ‘A’ was proceeded against, and ‘A’ having attended the proceedings never objected to the proceedings and raised a plea for impleading all the legal heirs before the Assessing Officer. In view of this, he held that the proceedings. Under section 148 had been validly initiated against ‘A’ as legal heir of the deceased and the assessments consequent to assuming jurisdiction by issue of notices under section 148 were valid. On the merits of the case vis-a-vis the addition itself the Accountant Member confirmed the view taken by the Dy. Commissioner (Appeals) to direct the Assessing Officer to make necessary enquiries and redecide the matter. The Judicial Member, however, held that the notices under section 148 read with section 147(a) issued to one of the legal heirs only were void ab initio and the assessments which followed did not suffer from curable infirmity but were non est in law.

HELD (PER THIRD MEMBER)

The Accountant Member in his order had approved the action of the first appellate authority in restoring the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer asking him to re-process the same de novo but after bringing the other legal heirs on record. This direction was in conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Jai Prakash Singh (1996) 219 ITR 737 : 85 Taxman 40 (SC). Therefore, on the facts and the legal position, the view expressed by the Accountant Member had to be confirmed. (Related Assessment years : 1979-80 to 1981-82 and 1983-84 to 1985-86) –[Ashok Kumar v. ITO (2002) 80 ITD 33 : 74 TTJ 702 (ITAT Amritsar) (TM)]

Deceased derived income through his son (i.e. assessee herein). As returns for assessment years in question were not filed, ITO issued notices under sections 148 and 142(1) and made assessments in name of said son of deceased. Neither son in whose name assessments were made nor any other legal representative and heir of deceased had ever raised any objection about non-impleadment of all heirs and legal representatives before ITO during course of assessment proceedings nor before AAC on appeal. Assessee, on other hand, co-operated with ITO in making assessments. However, before Tribunal assessee submitted that despite giving names of all heirs of deceased ITO continued to treat him as sole heir of deceased and, hence, in these circumstances, assumption of jurisdiction by ITO was wrong. Tribunal quashed all assessment orders. For all practical purposes assessee represented estate of deceased and all other heirs and legal representatives of deceased wilfully abandoned plea of abatement and chose to be governed by assessment orders passed by ITO and, therefore, assessment proceedings were not nullity – Therefore, Tribunal erred in quashing assessment made on assessee

For the assessment years 1971-72, 1973-74, 1975-76 and 1976-77, the deceased derived income through his son (assessee) from hire charges of a cinema. As the returns were not filed, the ITO issuednotices under section 148, which was followed, by notice under section 142(1). The notices were again issued on 27.09.1977. Returns were ultimately filed for each of the four assessment years in question on 17.11.1977, for each of these years. The ITO after making certain disallowances and additions completed the assessment for these four years. The appeal before the AAC failed.

On second appeal the assessee raised a preliminary objection before the Tribunal that though in reply to the notices issued under section 143(3) he had given the names of all the heirs of the deceased but even then the ITO continued to treat the assessee as the sole heir of the deceased. In these circumstances, it was argued before the Tribunal that the assumption of jurisdiction by the ITO was wrong. The Tribunal accepted the preliminary objection raised by the assessee and quashed the assessment orders for all the assessment years in question. On reference :

Held : From a perusal of section 159, it will be seen that a legal representative has been made liable to pay any sum which the deceased would have been liable to pay, if he had not died, in the like manner and to the same extent as the deceased and all the provisions of the Act, have been made applicable in such a case. Further, the legal representative of the deceased has been treated as a deemed assessee and hasbeen made personally liable for any tax liability of the deceased to the extent to which the estate of the deceased is capable of meeting the liability.

It was found that neither the assessee in whose name the assessments were made nor any other legal representative and the heirs of the deceased had ever raised any objection about non-impleadment of all the heirs and the legal representatives before the ITO during the course of the assessment proceedings. On the other hand, the assessee co-operated with the Assessing Officer in making the assessments. Thus, for all practical purposes he represented the estate of the deceased before the Assessing Officer. All other heirs and legal representatives of the deceased wilfully abandoned the plea of abatement and chose to be governed by the assessment orders passed by the ITO and the assessment proceedings were not a nullity.

The estate of the deceased, was sufficiently represented by the assessee and the assessments for the aforementioned assessment years had rightly been made in the name of the assessee. The Tribunal had erred in quashing the said assessments. [In favour of revenue] (Related Assessment years : 1971-72, 1973-74, 1975-76 and 1976-77) – [CIT v. Chandra Mohan Verma (2000) 244 ITR 430 : (1999) 155 CTR 328 (All.)]

Notice under section 148 was issued in name of deceased assessee – Assessee’s widow filed return under protest – Since widow of assessee had participated in proceedings, defect, if any, in issuing notice was automatically cured

The assessee gifted a sum to his wife which was invested by her in firm. The ITO noticing that the share income of the wife of the assessee from said firm which was includible in the assessee's hands under section 64 had escaped assessment initiated proceedings under section 147. The assessee subsequently expired. The ITO issuednotices under section 148 for all the assessment years in the name of the assessee. The widow of the deceased, filed returns under protest. The notices under section 143(2) were not responded to and the ITO completed the assessment for all the six years under section 144, read with section 147. Thereafter the widow of the assessee, as a legal heir of the assessee filed an appeal ,contending that the reassessment proceedings were initiated on the dead person and the entire proceedings should be held to be void. The AAC rejected the contention. The Tribunal also negatived the widow’s contention. On reference:

Held : In the instant case whether the issue of notice on a dead person under section 292B should be treated to be a procedural irregularity or whether it was a nullity, was academic since the widow of the deceased had already participated in the proceedings, this legal issue needed not be decided in the instant case. However, the very fact that the widow of the assessee had participated in the proceedings, the defect, if any, stood automatically cured. Hence, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the reassessment proceedings were valid when the notice under section 148 was issued in the name of a dead person and was served upon a person not shown to be authorized on behalf of the legal representatives of the assessee.

With regard to the second question as to whether the income of the widow, should be includible in the income of the deceased or not, on the basis of the material placed on record, the Tribunal had found the income of the widow was includible in the income of the assessee. There was no reason to take a different view from the one taken by the Tribunal. [In favour of revenue] (Related Assessment years : 1975-76 to 1980-81) – [Smt. Kaushalyabai v. CIT (1999) 238 ITR 1008 : 149 CTR 205 (MP)]

Sunday, 18 December 2022

Condonation of Delay in filing Appeal before the CIT(A) - [Section 249(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961]

Appeal has to be filed within time prescribed under the relevant provisions. An appeal filed beyond time prescribed under the law is liable to be dismissed. However, the CIT(A) may admit an appeal after the expiration of the limitation period on sufficient cause for not filing it within that period being shown. Application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, giving the reasons for the delay, along with necessary evidences should be filed with Form No. 35 (i.e., form of appeal). The CIT(A) can condone the delay in filing the appeal if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.

Text of section 249(3)

(3) The Commissioner (Appeals) may admit an appeal after the expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.

 

The powers conferred upon the CIT(A) under section 249(3), for condoning the delay in filing of appeal if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period, are statutory power to alleviate genuine suffering of taxpayers, so far as their grievance redressal by way of appeals are concerned, within framework of law. When a public authority has the powers to do something, he has a corresponding duty to exercise these powers when circumstances so warrant or justify. The question then arises as to what should be the circumstances which ordinarily warrant or justify the relaxation of the rigour of limitation provisions.

As we deal with this aspect of the matter, it is useful to take note of Section 14 of the Limitation Act which is titled “Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction” Section 14(1) of the Limitations Act provides that, “In computing the period of limitation …………. the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it”.

It is also only elementary that while interpreting a statutory provision one has to go from red to the black (a rubro ad nigrum) which essentially lays down the principle that the heading must hold key to the text. Translated literally, the latin maxim a rubro ad nigrum implies that one has to read from the red to the black; from the rubric or title of a statute, (which, in ancients times used to be written in red letters) to its body, which was in the ordinary black. The provisions of this exclusion clause are required to be interpreted in a liberal manner in consonance with the object indicated by the heading of the section. Essentially, therefore, when the delay in filing of an appeal is on account of the fact that the person filing the appeal was pursuing his case before the wrong forum, the scheme of law requires such a delay to be condoned. When we thus interpret the provisions of Section 14(1), there is no ambiguity about the scheme of things envisaged by this statutory provision. What essentially follows from this provision is that when someone is pursuing the matter in a forum, whether original or appellate, which, on account of “defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature” is unable to entertain the grievance of the applicant, the time so spent by that person is to be excluded.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy 2008 (228) ELT 162, while condoning the delay of 883 days in filing an application for setting aside the ex parte decree held

“That the purpose of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public  policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth  as a part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost  consideration to the suitor.”

The Apex Court in Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab (1995) 6 SCC 614, under the peculiar circumstances of the case condoned the delay of about 31 years, in approaching the apex Court and held that it must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down the pleas and to shut the doors against him. If explanation does not smack mala fide or does not put forth as a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration of such litigant.

Delay of over 3800 days in challenging CIT(A) order, not condonable; Holds ignorance of law no excuse

Delhi ITAT dismisses Assessee's application for condonation of 3853 days in filing the appeal against CIT(A) order; Observes that application for condonation of delay was not supported by an affidavit and the Assessee took a contrary stand in the application and written submission filed during the course of hearing and the reason shown for the condonation of delay does not establish sufficient cause in terms of Section 253(5); Also holds that filing of appeal against the CIT(A) order is only an afterthought and not a case of lack of awareness of provisions of filing of the appeal and once the issue got settled due to efflux of time, it cannot be permitted to be revived merely because the Assessee suddenly wakes up and files an appeal without providing any valid or genuine ground for condonation of delay; Assessee was subject to reassessment proceedings on the basis of information received from customs authorities and the Revenue proceeded with best judgement assessment under Section 144; CIT(A) upheld the order of Revenue; Subsequently, after four years, Assessee moved rectification application under Section 154 on the ground that the complaint filed by the Custom Authrorities before Magistrate got quashed and the sole reason for the reopening did not exist and the order under Section 144 requires rectification; Revenue dismissed the rectification application on the ground of limitation and held that the quashing of complaint filed by Customs Authority will not have any impact on income-tax; Before ITAT, Assesee assails both orders passed by CIT(A) and by Revenue under Section 154 and contends that limitation prescribed in Section 154 does not apply in a case where effect has to be given to an order of the court; ITAT observes that Assessee in appeal memo stated that the delay is simply due to the fact that the Assessee did not knew the correct course of action to be taken and based on the advice of the counsel the appeal is filed, however, the written submission depicts that the delay is attributable to the closure of collateral proceedings before the magistrate and such a vague reason does not establish sufficient cause under Section 253(5); Also observes that the reason of huge gap between the appeal filed against the CIT(A) order and the order of magistrate quashing the complaint filed by custom authorities against the Assessee remains unexplained; On the issue of rectification under Section 154, ITAT observes that subsequently to the dismissal of appeal by CIT(A), Assessee instead of filing an appeal before Tribunal against CIT(A) order, attempted to test his luck by filing rectification application before the Revenue; Remarks that "When Assessee abandons its statutory right of filing the appeals within limitation and has cautiously taken such decision, he cannot be permitted to purse the right again"; Rejects the contention of Assessee that limitation under Section 154 does not apply to the present case and observes that the order passed by magistrate on the compliant filed by Customs Authority against the Assessee is in respect of a completely seperate proceeding and has no impact, whatsoever, in the income tax proceedings and the reason stated in rectification application filed before the Revenue does not fall in the category of mistake apparent on record as envisaged in Section 154; Accordingly, dismisses Assessee's appeal. [In favour of revenue] (Related Assessment year : 1993-94 & 1994-95) – [Brijesh Charitable Trust v. ACIT, Panipat [TS-628-ITAT-2022(DEL)] – Date of Judgement : 27.07.2022 (ITAT Delhi)]

CIT(A) has not approached the matter judiciously and has dismissed the appeal of the assessee, by rejecting the application for condonation of delay, without assigning any specific reasons why the delay in filing appeal should not be condoned - Application for condonation of delay cannot be rejected without assigning any specific reasons

ITAT held that Ld. CIT(A) has not approached the matter judiciously and has dismissed the appeal of the assessee, by rejecting the application for condonation of delay, without assigning any specific reasons why the delay in filing appeal should not be condoned. There is no allegation to the effect that the assessee acted in a mala-fide manner and further, Ld. CIT(A) has not brought anything on record as to how the assessee would stand to gain by not filing the appeal in time. There is a minor delay of 67 days, for which, in our view, the assessee has given a plausible explanation. In the assessment framed on the assessee, Ld. Assessing Officer has made an addition of 17 lakhs approximately income in the hands of the assessee as undisclosed income, which according to the assessee does not belong to him since he acted as a mere Power of Attorney, on behalf of the Seller, who received the entire payment. The assessee, in our view, should not be precluded an opportunity of hearing on account of a delay of mere 67 days in filing appeal. Even otherwise, as held by ITAT in the case of Kashmir Road Lines v. DCIT (2021) 123 taxmann.com 5 (ITAT Amritsar), even when the assessee is not interest in pursuing the appeal, even then the Ld. CIT(A) should dispose of the appeal on merits. Therefore, in view of the above, the delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) is being condoned and the matter restored to the first appellate authority to decide the appeal on merit after giving due opportunity of hearing to the assessee. (Related Assessment year : 2011-12) – [Rahul M. Vadodariya v. ITO-  Date of Judgement : 31.05.2022 (ITAT Ahmedabad)]

Condonation of delay granted as order passed without knowledge of Assessee

Held that condonation of delay in filing appeal granted in the interest of justice as the revenue did not refuted the contention of the assessee that he had no knowledge or order being passed. It is noted that there is a delay of 655 days in filing of appeal.

The assessee has filed an affidavit dated 29.03.2022 stating that delay in filing appeal before ITAT is caused due to the fact that neither the notice of hearing was received by the assessee from Ld. CIT(A) nor was the order passed by Ld. CIT(A) sought to be appealed against served upon the assessee, thereby causing the delay in filing appeal. The assessee came to know about the order of Ld. CIT(A) on going through the ITBA portal for status of appeal/ demand. Thereafter, he filed appeal before ITAT.

Held : In our considered view, looking into the reasons in the affidavit filed by the assessee wherein he has submitted that he had no knowledge of order being passed by Ld. CIT(A) and later came to know about the same only on going through the ITBA portal and coupled with the fact that the Revenue has neither refuted the contention of the assessee nor has brought anything to record to validate that copy of order of Ld. CIT(A) was duly served upon the assessee, in the interests of justice, we are condoning the delay in filing of appeal by the assessee and restoring the file to the Ld. CIT(A) for carrying out a detailed inspection of books of accounts of the assessee and carry out a verification of their genuineness and authenticity. In this regard, opportunity may also be given to the Ld. Assessing Officer for cross verification. The assessee is also directed to kindly co-operate in the matter and provide assistance to the Revenue. (Related Assessment year : 2015-16) -  [Pepperazzi Hospitality (P) Ltd.  v. ITO Date of Judgement : 08.04.2022 (ITAT Ahmedabad)

Condones delay of over 500 days in filing appeal before CIT(A) in non-resident’s case

Bangalore ITAT condones delay of 591 days and 775 days in filing of appeals before CIT(A) against the penalty orders under Sections 271(1)(c) and 271F and remits the matter back to CIT(A) to decide the issue afresh on merits; Revenue, for Assessment year 2016-17, passed the assessment order and thereafter passed the penalty orders under Section 271(1)(C) and under Section 271F, levying penalty of Rs. 13.19 Lacs and Rs. 5000, respectively; Assessee, a non-resident Indian, filed the appeal before CIT(A) with delay and explained that the delay was caused since he was a non-resident and advice of the tax consultant to represent before the Revenue; CIT(A) rejected the condonation petition holding that there was no reasonable cause for filing these appeals belatedly and affirmed the penalty orders; ITAT relies on the Supreme Court ruling in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and

Ors. 167 ITR 471 (SC), which laid down principles to be considered in condoning the delay and it was observed that if the application of the Assessee for condoning the delay is rejected, it would amount to legalise injustice on technical ground; ITAT observes that when substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right for injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay; Thus, opines that substantial justice have to be preferred rather than technicality in deciding the issue; Relies on Madras High Court ruling Sreenivas Charitable Trust wherein it was held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down in the matter of condonation of delay and the Court should adopt a pragmatic approach and the Court should exercise their discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression "sufficient cause" the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance and the expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction; Observes that there is no question of any excessive or inordinate delay when the reason stated by the Assessee was a reasonable cause for not filing the appeals. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2016-17) – [Suhas Suresh Shet v. ITO (International Taxation), Bengaluru [TS-300-ITAT-2022(Bang)] – Date of Judgement : 05.04.2022 (ITAT Bangalore)]

 

Condones delay of over 500 days in filing appeal before CIT(A) in non-resident’s case

Bangalore ITAT condones delay of 591 days and 775 days in filing of appeals before CIT(A) against the penalty orders under Sections 271(1)(c) and 271F and remits the matter back to CIT(A) to decide the issue afresh on merits; Revenue, for Assessment year 2016-17, passed the assessment order and thereafter passed the penalty orders under Section 271(1)(c) and under Section 271F, levying penalty of Rs.13.19 Lacs and Rs. 5000, respectively; Assessee, a non-resident Indian, filed the appeal before CIT(A) with delay and explained that the delay was caused since he was a non-resident and advice of the tax consultant to represent before the Revenue; CIT(A) rejected the condonation petition holding that there was no reasonable cause for filing these appeals belatcdly and affirmed the penalty orders; ITAT relies on the Supreme Court ruling in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (1987) 167 ITR 471 : 62 CTR 23 : 1987 AIR 1353 (SC), which laid down principles to be considered in condoning the delay and it was observed that if the application of the Assessee for condoning the delay is rejected, it would amount to legalise injustice on technical ground; ITAT observes that when substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right for injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay; Thus, opines that substantial justice have to be preferred rather than technicality in deciding the issue; Relies on Madras High Court ruling Sreenivas Charitable Trust v. DCIT (2006) 280 ITR 357 : 154 TAXMAN 377 (Mad.) wherein it was held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down in the matter of condonation of delay and the Court should adopt a pragmatic approach and the Court should exercise their discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression “sufficient cause” the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance and the expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction; Observes that there is no question of any excessive or inordinate delay when the reason stated by the Assessee was a reasonable cause for not filing the appeals. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2016-17) – [Suhas Suresh Shet v. ITO, International Taxation – Date of Judgement : 05.04.2022 (ITAT Bangalore)]

Expounds principles on condonation of delay, remands appeal to CIT(A) in interest of justice

Delhi ITAT allows Assessee’s appeal, relies on the Supreme Court ruling in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy to observe that the length of the delay is not relevant as long as the explanation for delay is acceptable and remands the case to the CIT(A) to decide the application for condonation of delay afresh alongwith the appeal; Assessee-Individual was subjected to assessment for Assessment year 2014-15 whereby Revenue made additions under Sections 68 and 69 and the assessment order passed under Section 144; CIT(A) dismissed Assessee’s application for condonation of delay in filing appeal on failure to provide day to day explanation for the delay, and to substantiate it factually and held, “Assessee’s appeal fails in limine” against which Assessee preferred the instant appeal; ITAT observes that while dealing with application for condonation of delay, the conduct of the parties and plausible reasoning for not filing the appeal within the statutory time is required to be seen; ITAT refers to the Supreme Court ruling in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987) ILLJ 500 SC wherein it was held that “the expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature in the Limitation Act is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice-that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts” and also that a liberal approach was required to be adopted on principle; Remarks that “If explanation does not smack mala fide or does not put forth as a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration of such litigant”; ITAT observes that in condoning delay what has to be seen is whether the party seeking condonation has made out a sufficient cause or not and that in the instant case, the CIT(A)’s order did not mention the length of delay or the reasonable cause shown for seeking the condonation, hence in the interest of justice and for just decision in the case, deems it appropriate to remand the case. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2014-15) – [Surendra Singh v. DCIT, Haridwar  [TS-162-ITAT-2022(DEL)] – Date of Judgement : 23.02.2022 (ITAT Delhi)]

Non communication of intimation by Tax Professional is sufficient cause for condonation of delay in appeal filing

In the instant case, the assessee had submitted that the orders passed under section 200A of the Act were never served on the assessee physically or otherwise. It was stated that intimation under section 200A downloaded from the office of the Assessing Officer by the Tax Professional, was not communicated to the assessee and since the Tax Professional had left the service of the assessee, the assessee has not able to correctly state when the intimation under section 200A of the Act was downloaded. It is stated that only when demand were sought to be collected by the Revenue, the assessee came to know of the order passed under section 200A of the Income Tax Act. We are of the view that the submissions of the assessee cannot be brushed aside as false. In the instant case, prima facie, the issue on merits is seen covered in favour of the assessee by the judgment of the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court Sri Fatheraj Singhvi v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2016) 289 CTR 602 (Kar.). Taking note of judicial pronouncement where expression “sufficient cause” has received a liberal construction, we condone the delay of filing these appeals before the CIT(A). We deem it appropriate to remit the issue of levy of fee under section 234E of the Act through intimation under section 200A of the Act to the file of the CIT(A) (since the CIT(A) has not decided the issue on merits). The CIT(A) shall afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee before a decision is taken in this matter. It is ordered accordingly. (Related Assessment year : 2013-14) – [Sameer Granites (P) Ltd. v. ACIT - Date of Judgement : 30.12.2021 (ITAT Bangalore)]

Assessee not liable for malfunctioning in e-appeal facility; Holds physically filed appeal before CIT(A) valid

Mumbai ITAT allows Assessee’s appeal, holds that the Revenue cannot take the benefit of non-functioning/ malfunctioning of its portal and deny the statutory right of the Assessee to appeal against the assessment order over technical failure in e-filing facility; Assessee filed an appeal before CIT(A) in physical mode on 23.01.2019 which was revised on 27.01.2020 on account of change of address as against Rule 45 of IT Rules that requires compulsory filing of the e-appeals before CIT(A) with effect from 01.03.2016; However, CIT(A) dismissed the appeal, treating the appeal as invalid; Assessee submitted that an e-appeal was filed on 12.03.2021 along with an application for condonation of delay and sought to justify the physical filling of appeal on the basis that notice under section 153A was issued on PAN of the deceased (Shri Ramniklal R. Mehta); The legal heir of the deceased filed the returns for the Assessee using PAN of the deceased before applying for new PAN for the Assessee; The legal heir could not login to the Revenue’s website through the newly allotted PAN and was unable to pay the taxes and file an appeal against the assessment order; On legal heir's grievance, ITBP website informed that since he was a minor, he was not authorized and a legal guardian could represent him for performing the required functions; ITAT observes that the Assessee had been filing the return of income electronically, therefore, the appeal against the assessment order was required to be filled electronically as per bare reading of the Rule 45 and Section 249; ITAT observes, “In our view, the assessee made sufficient and sincere efforts to file the appeal in electronic forms, albeit the assessee failed in his efforts for the reasons recorded in the order. In our considered opinion, the non filing of the electronic appeal was on account of the inaccessibility of the Income tax portal to the estate of Shri Ramniklal R. Mehta and assessee was forced to file the appeal in physical form”; Thus, expounds that rules are meant to achieve the ends of justice and not to put impediments in the path of justice and the non-filing of the e-appeal was on account of the inaccessibility of the portal which forced the Assessee to file an appeal in the physical form; ITAT sets aside CIT(A)’s order and directs CIT(A) decide the appeals on merit, grant hearing and also permit filing of any other documents in support of the case. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment years : 2011-12 to 2015-16) - [Estate of Ramniklal Rajmal Mehta v. DCIT [TS-1095-ITAT-2021(Mum)] – Date of Judgement : 30.11.2021 (ITAT Mumbai)]

Remits Assessee’s appeal before CIT(A) with direction for condonation of delay application, affidavit

Visakhapatnam ITAT allows Assessee’s appeal and condones delay in filing appeal with CIT(A), by legal heir of deceased Assessee for Assessment year 2013-14; Legal heir of the Assessee claimed that subsequent to the Assessee’s demise, completion of legal formalities to obtain relevant certificates was delayed, resulting in delay in filing of appeal; ITAT notes that Assessee’s appeal was dismissed in limine as not admitted on the ground of non-filing of the necessary application with supporting affidavit, and observes that though the reason for delay was mentioned, appropriate documents including affidavit were not furnished; ITAT observes that the application for condonation of delay is supposed to be filed along with the appeal itself however, refers to Supreme Court ruling in State of M.P. and Anr. v. Pradeep Kumar and Anr wherein it was held that the same can be entertained at a later stage; ITAT notes the peculiar circumstances of the case and remarks that “…may be due to lack of knowledge or guidance or inadvertence, the appellant failed to file the appropriate application and supporting affidavit/evidence in support of reasons for delay”; ITAT remands back the case to CIT(A) for fresh adjudication while affording reasonable opportunity to the Assessee for filing an appropriate application along with affidavit/evidence in support of reasons for delay. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2013-14) – [Tatineni Ramesh Kumar v. ITO, Vijayawada [TS-554-ITAT-2021(VIZ)] – Date of Judgement : 24.06.2021 (ITAT Visakhapatnam)]

Condones delay of 1425 days in filing appeal before CIT(A) on ‘sufficient cause’ given by assessee

Chennai ITAT condones delay of 263 days for Assessment year 2013-14 and 1425 days for Assessment year 2014-15 and 2015-16 in filing appeal before CIT(A) and directs CIT(A) to adjudicate the issue on merits; CPC. TDS processed assessee’s TDS statement and issued intimation u/s 200A through e-mail,  which was unnoticed due to oversight of employee; Upon intimation of notice, appeals were filed before CIT(A) with a delay, which were not condoned; ITAT observes that there is no willful negligence on the part of assessee; Refers to ‘sufficient cause’ under Limitation Act, 1963 and remarks that there is no law laid down regarding condonation of delay and that Courts have taken a liberal approach; Opines that resorting to delay benefits no litigant, and refusal to condone such delay results in justice being defeated; Holds, “When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay”; Relies on Supreme Court ruling in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy where it was held that ‘sufficient cause’ under the Limitations Act should be construed liberally to advance substantial justice; Accordingly, sets aside the common orders passed by CIT(A). [In favour of assessee] - [Inscribe Graphics Ltd. – Date of Judgement : 16.02.2021 (ITAT Chennai)]

Limitation Act to aid taxpayer filing delayed appeal chasing ‘wrong forum’ - Power conferred upon the CIT(A) to condone the delay in filing of appeal is to alleviate genuine suffering of taxpayers. He has the power and corresponding duty to exercise the power when circumstances so warrant. Under section 14 of the Limitation Act, delay caused due to proceeding in a wrong forum has to be condoned.

Hyderabad ITAT condones delay in filing of appeal before CIT(A), cites assessee’s (UAE resident) 'bonafide, even if overoptimistic and erroneous' assessment about efficacy of rectification under section 154 to seek redressal of its grievance; Assessee had filed rectification application disputing levy of surcharge and cess on royalty and interest income taxable under India - UAE DTAA, which was rejected by Assessing Officer holding the issue to be a debatable one; Subsequently assessee filed an appeal before CIT(A) against the assessment order which was dismissed citing delay in filing of appeal; Holding the CIT(A) was clearly in error in not condoning the delay in filing of appeal which was, in our humble understanding, a result of a bonafide, even if overoptimistic and erroneous, assessment about efficacy of section 154 to seek redressal of his grievance in question. The assessee had followed an inappropriate course, and, with the benefit of hindsight, there is no dispute about this error. ITAT also observes that while in the instant case invokation of Section 14(1) of Limitation Act, 1963 is not warranted, however the same would also come to the rescue of the taxpayer in cases where delay in filing of an appeal is on account of pursuing one's case before the wrong forum; The delay in filing of appeal before the CIT(A), against the assessment under section 143(3), therefore, indeed deserves to be condoned. We reverse the stand of the CIT(A) on this point. The order of the CIT(A) thus stands vacated.” [In favour of assessee] – [R.A.K. Ceramics, UAE [TS-160-ITAT-2019(HYD)] – Date of Judgement : 29.03.2019 (ITAT Hyderabad)]

Form of appeal and limitation - Delay of 231 days - Affidavit was filed explaining the delay - Revenue has not disputed the correctness of the affidavit – Delay was condoned – Matter remanded to Tribunal to decide on merits

Allowing the appeal of the assessee, the Court Held that; there is no any such gross negligence on the part of the appellant especially in the light of the reasons assigned for filing the appeal belatedly, which have not been controverted by the revenue. Therefore, the matter should not be shut down on technicalities and a liberal approach should be taken bearing in mind the reasons assigned by the appellant, as the assessee is a joint venture company controlled by the Government of Tamil Nadu and its DCEO, who is invariably in the cadre of IAS Officer, is being nominated by the Government and he has to take a decision to file an appeal. The appellant has submitted that in the assessee’s own case for the assessment years 1995-96, 1996-97 and 2001-02, a Division Bench of this Court, decided the very same issue in favour of the assessee. In the result, the above tax case appeal is allowed, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the assessee and the order passed by the Tribunal is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Tribunal to take a decision on the merits of the case. (Related Assessment year : 1997-98) – [Elnet Technologies Ltd. v. DCIT (2018) 259 Taxman 593 (Mad.)]

175 days delay in filing appeal was condoned where assessee was waiting for outcome of penalty order

The assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) along with an application for condonation of delay of 175 days. The assessee claimed that delay occurred since he was waiting outcome of penalty order. The Commissioner (Appeals) however refused to condone the delay.

Held that the reason stated by the assessee in these cases is that he was waiting for the outcome of the penalty proceedings. Therefore, one has to consider, whether reasonable prudent person would do so. The inference of such delay has to be drawn on the basis of circumstances available on record and conduct of the assessee. After considering the surrounding circumstances and applying the test of human probabilities, one has to reasonably conclude that the plea of the assessee is genuine. The explanation offered by the assessee for the delay cannot be rejected as false or devoid of merits. Therefore, this short delay of 175 days is condoned. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2010-11) – [S.S.M. Ahmed Hussain v. ITO, Chennai (2017) 81 taxmann.com 443 : (2016) 48 ITR(T) 417 (ITAT Chennai)]

Assessee filed an appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) against order of Assessing Officer along with a condonation petition on ground that appeal was filed in light of decision of Supreme Court in case of CIT v. Shaan Finance (P) Ltd. (1998) 97 Taxman 435 (SC) and as said decision was not available at time of due date, delay was caused - Commissioner (Appeals) refused to condonedelay holding that if delay was condoned, it would lead to proliferation of endless litigation - Even if filing of similar petitions might generate endless litigation, Tribunal has to sit in judgment on those petitions on merits and cannot refuse to sit in judgment citing consequential difficulties - Since assessee had no occasion to file appeal within time as pronouncement of Supreme Court was not available on due date and appeal was filed as soon as law had been declared, delay needed to be condoned, and, consequently, Assessing Officer should rectify assessment

The Assessing Officer had granted investment allowance claimed by the assessee under section 32A, in respect of additions made to plant and machinery of its unit. Thereafter, the assessee sold its unit to another company except certain machineries which were leased out by the assessee. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer passed an order under section 155(4A) withdrawing entire investment allowance including that of the machinery given on lease and held that leasing of assets would fall within the meaning of the term ‘otherwise transfer’. The assessee filed an appealbefore the Commissioner (Appeals) challenging that portion of the order of the Assessing Officer withdrawing investment allowance pertaining to assets leased. The assessee filed a petition for condonation of delay on the ground that the appeal was filed in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CITv. Shaan Finance (P) Ltd. (1998) 97 Taxman 435 (SC) and as said decision was not available at the time of due date, the delay was caused. The assessee also filed a rectification petition under section 154 before the Assessing Officer to rectify his earlier order. The Commissioner (Appeals) refused to condone the delay holding that if the delay was condoned, it would lead to proliferation of endless litigation with no finality attached to any order already passed. On second appeal :

Held : It is settled that the mistake arising as a result of subsequent interpretation of law by the Supreme Court would constitute ‘a mistake apparent from record’ and, therefore, rectification proceedings could be initiated accordingly. This position confers a legal right on an assessee to pursue the matter before appropriate authorities. The chance of proliferation of endless litigation is the result of the above legal position with which the Tribunal cannot interfere. The Tribunal cannot interfere in the rights of citizens and assessees. Even if filing of similar petitions may generate endless litigation, it has to sit in judgment on those petitions on the merits of the points raised therein and it cannot refuse to sit in judgment citing certain consequential difficulties.

The assessee had exercised its legitimate right to move the petition before the Assessing Officer and also filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). The Assessing Officer had not disposed of the petition filed under section 154 which was again not justified. Apart from the observation of the Commissioner (Appeals) regarding the proliferation of litigation, he had not otherwise considered the reasonableness of condoning the delay. The delay caused in the instant case before the Commissioner (Appeals) was of 180 days. The assessee got the chance to file rectification petition or an appeal as such, because of the subsequent pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court. The pronouncement was not available on the due date. Therefore, the assessee had no occasion to file an appeal within time but the assessee had filed the appeal as soon as the law had been declared by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the delay of 180 days needed to be condoned. The Commissioner (Appeals) had erred in not condoning the delay. The appeal was allowed. (Related Assessment year : 1989-90) – [Bajaj Hindusthan Ltd. v. JCIT (2005) 92 TTJ 1064 : 92 ITD 411 (ITAT Mumbai)]

Condones 5 years appeal filing delay based on subsequent ‘correct’ professional advice

ITAT condones 1836 days delay in filing appeal, accepts contention of assessee that the appeal was not preferred initially due to advice of its GM-Finance, but was filed 5 years later on ‘correct' professional advice given by a counsel; Tribunal notes that Supreme Court judgment in Smifs Securities had allowed depreciation claim on goodwill in August 2012, which was the issue in the instant case and that the assessee had quickly thereafter filed an appeal in June 2013;

Assessee, Sartorious Mechatronics India, acquired the business of weighing division of Phillips India Ltd and a sum of over Rs 64 lakhs was paid to the assessee as goodwill. The assessee, claimed depreciation on goodwill, but the same was however disallowed by Assessing Officer. The CIT(A), vide order (for Assessment years 2001-02 to 2003-04) dated 28.03.2008 affirmed the Assessing Officer’s order. On being advised by the Company’s GM - Finance that there was no purpose in filing further appeal, the assessee decided not to pursue the case further.

Five years later, while interacting with another counsel in relation to a different issue, the said counsel observed that an appeal had not been preferred against the CIT(A) order dated 28.03.2008 pertaining to depreciation on goodwill. He advised the assessee to file an appeal against the impugned order, which the assessee did on 18.06.2013, a delay of 1836 days. 

The assessee's counsel pleaded for condonation on the following grounds: 

(i)     That Tribunal ought to take a ‘liberal’ view in matters relating to condonation of delay, especially if the explanation offered for delay did not smack of ‘malafides.’ Apex court decision in Ramnath Rao and Bangalore ITAT ruling in Raghavendra Constructions v. ITO [ITA No.425/Bang/2012] order dated 14.12.2012, were cited to buttress the argument.

(ii)    The Supreme Court, in the case of CIT v. Smifs Securities [TS-639-SC-2012] : 348 ITR 302 (SC), vide judgment dated 22.08.2012, had allowed depreciation claim on goodwill, thereby putting the issue beyond any doubt and entitling the assessee in the instant case as well, to relief based on the ration laid down by apex court. The assessee relied on Karnataka High Court judgment in ISRO on the point that where the tax liability itself is non-existent, delay in filing appeals ought to be condoned1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

The DR meanwhile opposed the condonation plea, citing the ‘inordinate’ delay in filing appeal as also the assessee having accepted the assessment orders for Assessment years 2002-03 & 2003-04. 

The ITAT, while condoning the delay and ruling on merits in favour of assessee, noted the assessee's claim that the appeal was not filed initially due to an earlier advice and was filed once they received the ‘correct’ professional advice. The Tribunal then referred to Supreme Court judgment in Smif Securities which allowed depreciation claim on goodwill and left no room for any doubt as regards this debate.  The ITAT observed ' In such circumstances, we are of the view that the assessee should not be denied benefit which it is entitled to in law purely on technicalities. We are also satisfied that the delay in filing the appeals has occasioned on account of reasonable cause. In this regard, we find that in Raghavendra Constructions (supra), this Tribunal on identical issue held that subsequent professional advice and delay on account of earlier improper professional advice was sufficient cause to condone the delay in filing the appeal.

ITAT observes : the assessee should not be denied benefit which it is entitled to in law purely on technicalities. We are also satisfied that the delay in filing the appeals has occasioned on account of reasonable cause.' ; Relies on co-ordinate bench ruling in Raghavendra Constructions, to hold that subsequent professional advice and delay on account of earlier improper professional advice, a sufficient cause to condone delay; On DR’s contention that the assessee had accepted the assessment orders for 2 Assessment years, ITAT holds that tax liability cannot be fastened on the basis of ‘admission’ and ought to be imposed strictly in accordance with law.

Even on merits, ITAT allowed depreciation on goodwill, and dismissing DR’s contention with regard to the assessee having accepted the assessment orders for Assessment years 2002-03 and 2003-04, the ITAT held “tax liability cannot be imposed on the basis of admission and it should be strictly in accordance with law. ” ITAT, thus allowed the assessee’s appeal. [In favour of assessee] Assessment years: 2001-02 to 2003-04– [Sartorious Mechatronics India v. CIT [TS-229-ITAT-2015(Bang)] – Date of Judgement : 27.03.2015 (ITAT Bangalore)]

Rules cause of delay, not length, relevant for condoning delay; Cites Nand Kishore (SC)

The assessee, C Jegaveerapandian filed its return for Assessment year 1995-96 on August 28, 1997. Pursuant to a survey under section 133A on business premises of J.V.P. Associates, some documents evidencing individual business transactions of assessee were found. Based on such documents Assessing Officer reopened assessment under section 147 and as assessee failed to produce any books evidencing said income, Assessing Officer made certain additions by an order dated March 25, 2004.  On September 21, 2012 assessee preferred an appeal before CIT(A) challenging the said order. Assessee explained that he was living an isolated life owing to mental depression and thus received the notice of said proceedings only now. CIT(A) rejected assessee’s plea by holding that there was no reasonable cause for condonation of long delay of 8 ½ years. Aggrieved assessee preferred an appeal before Channai ITAT.

ITAT noted that it cannot be overlooked that on expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for seeking remedy, a corresponding right accrues in favour of the other party and the same should not be lightly interfered with. Thus ITAT held that assessee had to show that he was vigilant during this period and the delay was beyond his control. ITAT was of opinion that condoning an inordinate delay of 8 ½ years would frustrate the legitimate expectation of Revenue as it would have come to the conclusion that the order of Assessing Officer was accepted by assessee.

ITAT took note of  Supreme Court ruling in Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab [(1955) 6 SCC 614] wherein a delay of 31 years was condoned owing to sufficient causes and held that “rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy for the readdress the legal injury so suffered, the law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. The length of delay is not a material to condone the delay, the cause of delay is to be considered”. However as CIT(A) did not examine the circumstances which prevented assessee from filing appeal, ITAT ruled that “we are not in a position to express any opinion about condoning of the delay”. ITAT further opined that necessary enquiry regarding averments made by assessee should have been made by CIT(A) before ruling on the issue of condonation. Thus ITAT remanded matter back to the file of CIT(A) to conduct necessary enquiry regarding averments made by assessee for condoning delay of 8.5 years. [In favour of None/NA] (Related Assessment years : 1995-96 to 2002-03) – [C Jegaveerapandian v. ITO, Tuticorin [TS-149-ITAT-2015(CHNY)] – Date of Judgement : 18.03.2015 (ITAT Chennai)]

Condones appeal filing delay, expunges CIT(A)’s observations on merits in set-aside proceedings, condones assessee’s delay in filing appeal

The assessee, Modipon Limited’s appeal against Assessing Officer’s order with respect to Assessment years 2006-07 to 2008-09 became time barred by 142 days. In appeal, CIT(A) although dismissed the appeal as time barred but even so ruled on merits and held that the issue in appeal was a pure matter of verification and rectification and thus the correct remedy was to file a rectification petition under section 154. Thus, assessee instead of filing an appeal against CIT(A)’s order filed a rectification petition before Assessing Officer. Assessing Officer however rejected the same as he was of view that as the matter was decided by CIT(A) on merits it was not open to him to adjudicate on the same. Finally after obtaining legal advice on how to come out of this cul-de-sac, aggrieved assessee preferred appeal before Delhi ITAT seeking condonation of delay in filing of appeals.

Assessee argued before ITAT that the only remedy sought by it was the removal of fetters on the powers of the Assessing Officer under section 154 which were a result of unwarranted remarks of CIT(A). To the contrary Revenue argued that assessee was a very well established business house and thus it was unbelievable that the right legal advice was not available to it.

ITAT observed that while adjudicating upon a condonation petition it was not required to consider as to what should have happened in an ideal situation but all that it was required to see was whether the reason given by assessee were “reasonable reason which holds the test of human probabilities and which could be a sound reason for a reasonable person in the given circumstances”.

ITAT relied on Supreme Court ruling in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst Katiji & Ors [167 ITR 671] and held that “Here is a case in which a plain look at the impugned order suggests, to a layman even with some understanding of income tax procedures, that the remedy can be found at the stage of the Assessing Officer itself, and, based on this understanding, the appeal was not filed. However, with the unfolding of subsequent developments, the assesse had to resort to an expert opinion which suggested that filing of appeal against the order of the CIT(A) is absolutely essential to safeguard his legitimate interests. In these circumstances, in our considered view, there is a reasonable cause for condonation of delay.”

ITAT with respect to assessee’s contention that CIT(A)’s observations were unwarranted, relied on Kolkata ITAT ruling in Dr Murari Mohan Kokey v. ITO [ITA Nos 1397/Kol/2014 dated 05.11.2014] wherein it was held that once CIT(A) dismissed the appeal as time barred it should not have adjudicated it on merits. Kolkata ITAT had held that in such case “The findings given by CIT(A) on merits will have no bearing on fresh adjudication by CIT(A), in the set aside appellate proceedings”.

Thus condoning assessee’s delay, ITAT expunged CIT(A)’s observations on merits and dismissed the appeal as assesse did not wish to pursue the appeal beyond vacation of CIT(A)’s observations. [In favour of None/NA] – [Modipon Ltd. v. ITO [TS-805-ITAT-2014(DEL)] – Date of Judgement : 30.12.2014 (ITAT Delhi)]

 

CIT(A) chose not to condone the delay, he has no business to adjudicate the appeal on merits

The assessee preferred appeals against these assessment orders (ex parte) on 27.11.2012. According to CIT(A), these appeals were filed after a lapse of nearly 310 days. The CIT(A) has not condoned the delay and dismissed the appeal as time barred by observing in para 3.3 of his appellate order as under:

“3.3 Therefore, the appeal has been filed after a lapse nearly 310 days. The appeal filed much beyond the time prescribed in section 249 of the Income Tax Act. The reason given for filing of late appeal [Non-receipt of order served by affixture] can not be accepted as the assessee was assisted by Authorized Representative for his proceeding. The assessment year of the current year was reopened as a result of assessment done for Assessment year 2008-09, in which the maintenance of an undisclosed bank account, as per AIR Information was obtained. The issues dealt with, were same as that in those year. However, the assessee left for his wife’s treatment, without responding to the notices, when the assessment was about to be time barred. Subsequently penalty notices under section 271(1)(c) and 271(1)(b) were fixed which were received by the assessee on 14.06.2012, in which reference to the penalty notice issued on 30.12.2011 alongwith assessment order was referred to. This again clearly indicates that the assessee was certainly aware of the completion of assessment proceeding at least as on 14.06.2012. In spite of it the appeal was filed on 27.11.2012. Subsequently, another notice by Speed Post was sent to him on 15.06.2012, for penalty. Subsequently, penalty u/s. 271 (1)(c) and 271(1)(b) were imposed on 26.06.2012. The penalty orders were served by Speed Post in assessee’s address on 12.07.2012. A11 these taken together clearly indicates that the assessee was very well aware regarding the completion of order. However the assessee choose for whatever reason, not to comply to the notices issued and avoid receipt of notice directly at his address or through authorized representative, causing the department to serve the notice through either affixation or by post. Similar conduct was also noticed during appellate proceeding, when the assessee never received the notices directly, and the notices had to be served on persons claiming to be his relatives, by Notice server or sent by Speed Post, again to be received by others. Therefore, as the appeal has been filed belated and sufficient cause for such delay is not there the appeal is dismissed as being time barred.”

The CIT(A) after dismissing the appeal as time barred also gone into merits of the case and decided the issue. Aggrieved against dismissing the appeal as time barred and not condoning the delay file appeal before the ITAT.

Held : In the present case before us the CIT(A) has not condoned the delay but he as adjudicated the issues on merits as is evident from the impugned appellate order. We are of the view that in case CIT(A) chose not to condone the delay, he has no business to adjudicate the appeal on merits. For this, we are of the view that first of all, the appeal should be admitted for making a decision on merits because the right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and quasi judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant. If the statute gives a right to appeal upon certain conditions, it is upon fulfillment of those conditions that the right becomes vested in and exercisable by the appellant. Here the assessee’s appeal is delayed as alleged by CIT(A) and without admitting the appeal he has adjudicated the same on merits. Once the appeal is not admitted nothing is pending before him. A judgment of Hon’ble Bombay High Court (under the old Act of 1922) in the case of CIT v. Mysore Iron & Steel Works (1949) 17 ITR 478 (Bom.), wherein it is held that there is no appeal from the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner refusing to condone the delay under Section 30, subsection (2), of the Income-tax Act.”.

In view of the above decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court, we are of the view that the CIT(A), once not admitted the appeal as barred by limitation, he should not have adjudicated on merits. The findings given by CIT(A) on merits will have no bearing on fresh adjudication by CIT(A), in the set aside appellate proceedings. In term of the above, we set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and remand the matter back to the file of CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. (Related Assessment year : 2004-05 to 2007-08 & 2009-10) - [Dr. Murari Mohan Kokey v. ITO, Kolkata – Date of Judgement : 05.11.2014 (ITAT Kolkata)]

Liberal approach for condoning delay not licence to prefer appeals at will

The assessee, Prashant Projects Ltd., is engaged in the business of construction of storage handling Terminal of Petroleum Products. The assessee filed its return of income for Assessment year 2005-06 on 31.10.2005 declaring total income of Rs. 45.49 lacs. Assessing Officer determined the total income at Rs. 111.17 lacs, as per the assessment order under section 143(3) of the Act, on December 31, 2007, which was received by the assessee on 25.01.2008. Accordingly, appeal was to be filed by 24.02.2008, but it was filed on 09.06.2011, after a delay of more than 3 years.

According to the assessee, the appeal for the additions made in assessment order was filed in the office of the Assessing Officer by mistake. After the assessee came to know that the appeal was to be filed before the CIT(A), in May 2011, the assessee moved an application to the Assessing Officer to transfer the appeal to the office of the FAA. Dismissing the appeal, the FAA observed that the assessee had been assissted by CA’s in the past and the huge gap of more than 3 years had not been explained by the assessee. Thus, the CIT(A) held that the assessee was totally negligent, the cause of delay was avoidable by due care and attention and there was no reasonable cause for delay within the meaning of provisions of Section 249(3). Aggrieved assessee approached ITAT.

Before ITAT, the assessee submitted that the delay in filing the appeal was because of bona fide belief that appeal was filed before the right forum and therefore taking a liberal view the FAA should have condoned the delay. The assessee relied on plethora of judgements including the case of Ram Nath Sao (3 SCC 195), Mst. Katiji (167 ITR 471), N. Balkrishnan (7 SCC 123), Sankar Rao (AIR 1987 SC1726), Bharat Auto Center (282 ITR 366-All.), Cheminor Drugs Ltd. 105 ITD 613 (ITAT -Hyderabad) and case of General Williams Masonic (ITAT Delhi), wherein the courts have taken liberal view in condoning the delay.

Ruling in favour of the Revenue, ITAT first discussed the philosophy and history of law of condonation of delay. ITAT observed that the seed of condonation of delay were seen in the the provision of the Act way back from 1860 and in all its subsequent enactments, where the appelllate authority may allow a person to appeal even after the stipulated period for 'special reasons'. Thus, discretion was given to the presiding officer to accept the belated petition. On the same basis, Section 249(3) of the present Act allows CIT(A) to admit belated appeals, if the appellant can show sufficient cause for not filing appeal in time. In this regard ITAT observed that 'It is said that the law of limitation is enshrined in the maxim that it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. But, said rules are meant to see that the parties seek their remedy promptly. Condonation of delay is the discretion of the Presiding Officers of judicial forums and is governed by section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.Courts are of the view that the words ‘sufficient cause’ of the said Act, should receive a liberal construction, so as to advance substantial justice. Once a judicial forum accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion. These provisions do not envisage that such a discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. The length of the delay is not the matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Following the spirit of advancing substantial justice, Act has included discretionary powers for condoning delay in filing appeals’.

Relying on the Supreme Court rulings in Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd. [348 ITR 7], Balwant Singh (Dead.) v. Jagdish Singh [8 SCC 685], Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Subrata Borah Chowlek [3 GLR 312], Ajit Singh Thakur Singh & Anr. v. State of Gujarat [1 SCC 495], ITAT observed that delay can be condoned only if there is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide. Secondly, assessee should furnish acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone delay. In addition to the aforesaid basic principles of condonation of delay, based on judicial precedents, ITAT extracted the following general principles of condoning delay:

(i)       If sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown, discretion is available to the FAAs to condone the delay and admit the appeal.

(ii)     The expression ‘sufficient cause’ is not defined, but it means a cause which is beyond the control of an assessee. The test whether or not a cause is sufficient is to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. What is of essence is whether it was an act of prudent or reasonable man.

(iii)    In every case of delay, there is some lapse on the part of the assessee. If there are no mala fides and it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the FAA should consider the application of the assessee. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned otherwise than a bona fide conduct, then the FAA should lean against acceptance of the explanation.

(iv)    Section 249(3) is discretionary in nature and the assessee cannot seek condonation of delay under this provision as a matter of right, but has to satisfy the FAA by explaining the sufficient cause for the delay.

(v)      Just because there is merit in the appeal filed by the assessee, any amount of delay, however, negligently caused, cannot be condoned.

(vi)    Requirement of sufficient cause for delay cannot be ignored and it becomes very important and significant when the delay is inordinate and abnormal.

(vii)   Explanation of delay for the entire period is necessary. The assessee is expected to show that delay was occasioned due to some sufficient cause. The cause pleaded should not only be a probable one but it should be real and sufficiently reasonable. The cause must fit in the facts and circumstances of the given case and the explanation offered regarding the delay occasioned by such cause should appeal to reasons so as to get judicial approval. In matters of delay it is neither practicable nor desirable to explain minute-to-minute/hour-to-hour delay, but delay has to be explained.

(viii) When an application for condonation of delay is made, to consider whether a sufficient cause has been made out by the assessee; the order of the FAA should disclose that he had applied his mind to the question raised before it. Due exercise of judicial discretion is a pre-condition for allowing/ refusing an application filed for condoning delay.

(ix)    The application for condonation of delay should contain substantially all the relevant material and as far as possible it should be supported by affidavit, showing that there is sufficient cause for condonation.

(x)      If the delay is not vitiated by any error of law it should be condoned.

(xi)    Any event, cause or circumstance arising after the expiry of the limitation period cannot constitute a sufficient cause.

(xii)   Non-filing of appeal before the FAA, before the end of limitation period, creates a vested right in favour of the Revenue. In such cases Revenue gets a legitimate and undisputed right over the tax-revenue accruing to it in pursuance of the order of the Assessing Officer. This right cannot be disturbed in a light-hearted manner.

(xiii) Cases of belated appeals matters have to be essentially analysed in the facts of each case-no general formula can be or should be applied, so as to ensure that an otherwise genuine cause of justice is not defeated by adherence to technical precedence.

(xiv) Condonation of delay, though an equitable relief, cannot be accorded merely on sympathy or compassion and the grounds offered have to be evaluated to test whether the party in default had been guilty of conscious and deliberate inaction, culpable negligence and inexcusable indifference to the period of limitation mandatorily prescribed by law.

 

Based on the aforesaid principles, ITAT concluded that the touchstone for condonation of delay is 'sufficiency/ reasonableness of the cause'. Filing of a belated appeal is an abnormal step and such extraordinary remedies need existence of extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, the assessee has to prove that abnormal circumstances really and factually existed in a particular case.

Based on facts of the present case, ITAT noted that it was clear that the assessee was well aware of procedural aspect and legal provisions of the Act. ITAT held that 'we are aware that adopting a liberal view in condoning delay is one of the guiding principles in the realm of belated appeals, but liberal approach cannot be equated with a licence to file appeals at will-disregarding the time limits fixed by the statutes. Except for the inaction and negligence of the assessee, there are no other reason for filing a belated appeal. We have avoided using adjectives before the words inaction and negligence, which are generally used by the higher forums of judiciary when they find that delay is result of total lack of prudence’.

ITAT observed that for a period of more than three years, the assessee did not bother to find out the outcome of the appeal it had filed and termed such behaviour of the assessee as personified inaction and negligence. Judicial precedents have held that act of negligence and inaction do not constitute reasonable cause.

Further by not filing appeal in time before the FAA, the assessee had allowed the State to believe that it had a vested right in its favour. ITAT held that Rights of the Sovereign are as important as that of the tax-payers. In matter of condonation of delay both have to show a sufficient cause which a prudent person can believe.

ITAT also noted that no affidavits were filed and no sufficient cause of delay was explained. Further, ITAT observed that “the assessee was aware about CBDT instruction with regard to stay of demand. Assessee, a corporate-assessee, filing returns of income of lacs of rupees and assisted by highly qualified professionals cannot take shadow of umbrella of ignorance of the provisions of law. It is also not the case of the assessee that it was guided by the wrong advice of the professional or it took time to consult professsionals. An individual of a small place and an ISO 9001-2000-company cannot be equated, while considering the condonation of delay”

Accordingly, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, ITAT upheld the CIT(A)’s order and dismissed the assessee’s appeal for condonation of delay in filing appeal. [In favour of revenue] (Related Assessment year : 2005-06) – [Prashant Projects Ltd. v. DCIT [TS-447-ITAT-2013(Mum)] – Date of Judgement : 04.09.2013 (ITAT Mumbai)]

Courts and quasi-judicial bodies are empowered to condone delay if a litigant satisfies Court that there were sufficient reasons for availing remedy after expiry of limitation - Delay in filing appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) was explained to be on account of earthquake and ill-health of his wife coupled with change of his address thrice - Where assessee’s explanation does not smack of mala fide or it is not put forth as a part of dilatory strategy, Court must show utmost consideration to such litigant - Therefore, in instant case, delay in filing appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) was to be condoned and matter restored to him for deciding said appeal

The assessee moved an application under section 154, which was disposed of by the Assessing Officer. The appeal against the said order was filed before the Commissioner (Appeals) with a delay of more than 6 months. The assessee explained that the delay was on account of earthquake and ill health of his wife coupled with change of his address due to certain family dispute. The Commissioner (Appeals), however, rejected the explanation of the assessee on the ground that the reasons were very general in nature and did not explain specifically as to why the delay had occurred. On second appeal :

Held : The Courts and the quasi-judicial bodies are empowered to condone the delay if a litigant satisfies the court that there were sufficient reasons for availing the remedy after expiry of the limitation. Such reasoning should be to the satisfaction of the Court.

In the instant case, on account of earthquake and ill health of his wife, the assessee had been facing many problems, simultaneously. According to him, order under section 154 was served upon him at the old address. That communication had also consumed time. Therefore, the assessee could not gain anything by filing the appeal late. There was no mala fide imputable to the assessee. The delay in filing the appeal was the result of ill health coupled with the change of his address thrice in a short span. In every case of delay there can be some lapse of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down the plea and to shut the doors against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fide or it is not put-forth as a part of dilatory strategy, the Courts must show utmost consideration to such litigant. At the most for the inaction or a little negligence, the assessee could be burdened with the cost. But his right of hearing of the appeal on merit ought not to be shut. Therefore, the delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was condoned and the matter restored to the first appellate authority to decide the appeal on merit. (Related Assessment year : 1999-2000) - [Kiran Laxmikant Joshi v. ITO (2004) 3 SOT 822 (ITAT Ahmedabad)]

It was held that the court has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression “sufficient cause”, the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance. – [Vedabaialias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil and Others (2002) 253 ITR 798 (SC)]

The Supreme Court had condoned a delay of 833 days. It was observed that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court and the only criteria is the acceptability of explanation irrespective of the length of delay. – [N. Balkrishan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123]

What constitutes sufficient cause

What constitutes sufficient cause has been considered in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Others and it was held that “The Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matter on “merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice - that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matter instituted in this court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that—

(i) Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

(ii) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

(iii) “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, commonsense and pragmatic manner.

(iv) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay.

 (v) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.

(vi) It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. – [Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC)]

A subsequent decision of the Supreme Court/High Court was considered as sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing the appeal. – [State of Andhra Pradesh v. Venkataramana Chudava & Muramura Merchant (1986) 159 ITR 59 (AP)]

On knowing that the High Court had dismissed his appeal on the ground that his Advocate was not present in the Court when the matter was taken up for hearing the appellant moved an application for the recall of the order dismissing the appeal and for permission to participate in the hearing of the appeal. The High Court rejected this application stating that no satisfactory explanation had been furnished by the Advocate for his slackness in filing the affidavit for nearly 15 days after it was drafted.

It has been held that the mistake of the counsel may in certain circumstances be taken into account in condoning the delay although there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always a sufficient ground. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that there is a mistake of the counsel and, therefore, the delay in filing the appeal has been condoned. – [Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Nirmala Devi & Sons (1979) 118 ITR 507 (SC)]

Where an application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal is preferred, it is the statutory obligation of the appellate authority to consider whether sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal in time was shown by the appellant. – [Shrimant Govindrao Narayanrao Ghorpade v. CIT (1963) 48 ITR54 (Bom.)]

It was held that for condoning the delay, the appellant may only be called upon to explain the delay covered by the period between the last day prescribed and the day on which the appeal is filed. – [Ramlal v. Rawa Coal Fields Ltd. AIR 1962 (SC) 361]

Revenue can object to delay in filing appeal

If an appeal by an assessee is admitted without the fact of delay in its presentation having been noticed, it is open to the department to raise the objection at the time of hearing of the appeal. – [Mela Ram & Sons v. CIT (1956) 29 ITR 607 (SC)]