The
‘Law of Limitation’ prescribes the time-limit for different suits within, which
an aggrieved person can approach the court for redress or justice. The suit, if
filed after the exploration of the time-limit, is struck by the law of
limitation. It's basically meant to protect the long and established user and
to indirectly punish persons who go into a long slumber over their
rights.
What happens when limitation period expires?
If a limitation period does apply and it expires, it may be
difficult or impossible to commence legal proceedings, even if your case has
merit. It is not necessary that the claim actually be heard in court within the
prescribed limitation period.
Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed.
Where the prescribed period for any
suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the
suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day
when the court reopens.
What is the limitation period for civil cases?
Typically,
the period of limitation for instituting civil suits is three years from
the date on which the cause of action arose. There are exceptions: the
limitation for a suit to recover possession of immovable property is 12 years,
and the limitation for a claim founded on tort is ordinarily one year.
‘Sufficient cause’ or not would dependent upon facts of each case
Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 enables the court to condone the delay in filing an appeal or application,
if the appellant or applicant satisfies the court that he had "sufficient
cause" for not preferring an appeal or making an application within such
period
According to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, any appeal or application may be accepted even after the limitation period for the same is over, if the appellant/applicant assures the court that he had a sufficient cause for not being able to file the appeal/application during the limitation period. If the court is satisfied, such delay in filing the appeal/application can be condoned irrespective of the party being a state or a private party.
The condition precedent for condonation of the delay in filing an application or appeal, is the existence of sufficient cause. Whether the explanation furnished for the delay would constitute ‘sufficient cause’ or not would dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be any straight jacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished by the applicant/appellant for the delay in taking steps. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception, when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party.
What is sufficient cause and what is not may be explained by the following Judicial observations:
·
Wrong practice of High
Court which misled the appellant or his counsel in not filing the appeal should
be regarded as sufficient cause under Section 5;
·
In certain cases, mistake
of counsel may be taken into consideration in condonation of delay. But
such mistake must be bona fide;
·
Wrong advice given by
advocate can give rise to sufficient cause in certain cases;
·
Mistake of law in
establishing or exercising the right given by law may be considered as
sufficient cause. However, ignorance of law is not excuse, nor the
negligence of the party or the legal adviser constitutes a sufficient
cause;
·
Imprisonment of the party
or serious illness of the party may be considered for condonation of delay;
·
Time taken for obtaining
certified copies of the decree of the judgment necessary to accompany
the appeal or application was considered for condoning the delay.
·
Non-availability of the
file of the case to the State counsel or Panel lawyer is no ground for
condonation of inordinate delay (Collector and Authorised Chief Settlement
Commissioner v. Darshan Singh and others, AIR 1999 Raj. 84).
·
Ailment of father during
which period the defendant was looking after him has been held to be a
sufficient and genuine cause (Mahendra Yadav v. Ratna Devi & others,
AIR 2006 (NOC) 339 Pat.
The quasi-judicial tribunals, labour courts or executive authorities
have no power to extend the period under this Section. There are no
categories of sufficient cause. The categories of sufficient cause are never
exhausted. Each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by
the court as such.
Applicability
of Section 14 of Limitation Act
Section 14(2) of the
Limitation Act excludes the time period spent by the petitioner in computing
the period of limitation for any application, subject to the following
essentials –
·
civil
proceedings have
been initiated with due diligence and in good faith.
·
proceedings
initiated against the same party for the same relief.
·
the
Court, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable
to entertain
Where no period of limitation is provided for moving an application
If no period of limitation is provided under the
Limitation Act, 1963 for moving an application, the period of limitation for
moving such application would be three years from the date when the right to
apply accrues.
State and Condonation of Day
The fact that it was the “State”
which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether
irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all
litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment
and the law is administered in an even- handed manner.
Time barred civil revisions & condonation of delay
According
to Art. 131 of the Limitation Act, 1963, limitation period for preferring a
revision under section 115 CPC is 90 days from the date of order under
challenge or from the date of knowledge of the order by the revisionist. Section
5 of the Limitation Act applies to civil revisions also and if the delay is
satisfactorily explained, the same may be condoned by the revisional court.
Extension
of limitation by Supreme Court due to Covid-19 pandemic also applies period
prescribed for filing of written statement
Where Trial Court declined appellants application dated 22-6-2021 seeking time to file written statement on ground that more than 120 days have been passed after date of service of summon and thus, appellant forfeited right to submit their written statement, in view of fact that Apex Court in Cognizance for Extension of Limitations, In re (2021) 132 taxmann.com 123 : 168 SCL 784 had extended limitation period from 15.03.2020 until 02.10.2021,
The
Supreme Court has clarified that the suo motu (at its own
behest) limitation extension which was ordered due to the COVID-19
pandemic and the shutting down of courts does apply to the period
prescribed for filing the written statement in commercial suits. In effect, the
top court has said that the limitation extension order(s) shall apply to the
filing period prescribed vis-à-vis written statement in commercial suits.
“In other words, the orders passed by
this Court on 23.03.2020, 06.05.2020, 10.07.2020, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021 in
SMWP No. 3 of 2020 leave nothing to doubt that special and extraordinary
measures were provided by this Court for advancing the cause of justice in the
wake of challenges thrown by the pandemic; and their applicability cannot be
denied in relation to the period prescribed for filing the written
statement...”, remarked
a bench of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Vikram Nath.
An
appeal was filed by Prakash Corporates against an order of the Chhattisgarh
High Court which had upheld a decision of the trial court. Following a
payment-related dispute between Prakash and Dee Vee Projects, a suit was
instituted on December 21, 2020. When the commercial court took the case for
consideration on June 22, 2021, the appellant sought an adjournment for filing
the written statement on the submission that they were entitled to the extension
in limitation to file it, even though the same went beyond 120 days as
applicable, as per the Supreme Court suo motu order(s).
The
limitation date for filing written statement expired on May 5, 2021 (as being
the 120th day from date of service of summons in terms of the applicable
provisions - this was not disputed). The Trial Court declined Prakash’s
(the defendant before it) application to file written statements on the ground
that as per the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(CPC) (as substituted by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015) such a right of the
defendant to file the written statement stood forfeited after 120 days from the
summons being serviced. A writ petition was filed under Article 227 before
the Chattisgarh High Court against the above order. It was essentially
submitted on behalf of the appellant that “the
Court was closed on May 6, 2021 (when the 120 days expired) due to imposition
of lockdown in pandemic control measures and on June 22, 2021, the application
was filed before Trial Court seeking time for filing written statement on
medical ground as the counsel for the appellant was in quarantine”.
It
was further contended that from the period of limitation, the period between
March 15, 2020 to March 14, 2021 would stand excluded in terms of the Supreme
Court’s order, following which the limitation would not end on May 6, 2021. The
Chhattisgarh High Court upheld the trial courts decision in the
impugned order wherein it took the view that “no Court could grant any extension of limitation against the
provisions of the enactment under which the case is being considered and heard” and that the
Supreme Court’s decision in its suo motu order(s) prescribing extension of
limitation did not apply in the present case.
The
division bench of the top court noted that on April 15, 2021, the Trial
Court had specifically fixed the matter for arguments but it could not
hear the parties and adjourned the matter to June 22, 2021 with reference to
its own administrative order and the High Court’s administrative order dated
April 5, 2021 which provided for truncated/curtailed functioning of
subordinate Courts in view of the pandemic; and the directions had been of
limited court functioning, even in terms of hours of working, essentially for
the purpose of the cases of urgent nature. The proceedings in the subject suit
were neither of urgent nature nor were considered so by the Trial Court and it
was for this reason that on April 15, 2021, the Trial Court simply adjourned
the matter beyond two months, the bench further noted. The top court also noted
that on June 22, 2021, the appellants had submitted before trial
court about the ailments of the partners of the appellant firm as also
their lawyer and their families, where the lawyer lost his mother due to health
complications and had thus asked for some time to file the written statements.
To this the top court said,
“Any proposition, which suggests that
during such non-regular-business days of the Trial Court, and rather bleak days
for the humanity, the written statement ought to have been filed, could only be
disapproved as being impractical and rather preposterous.”
It
was further held that assuming that while a suit could be filed
beyond limitation but within 90 days from October 3, 2021, the period for
filing written statement, if expired during that period, would operate against
the defendant, was unrealistic and illogical.
The two-judge
bench went on to reiterate that it is an unquestionable
principle that the rules of procedure are essentially intended to subserve the cause of justice and are not for punishment of the parties in conduct of the proceedings.
“Of course, in the ordinary
circumstances, the mandates of Rule 1(1) of Order V, Rule 1 of Order VIII as
also Rule 10 of Order VIII, as applicable to the Commercial dispute of a
Specified Value, do operate in the manner that after expiry of 120th day from
the date of service of summons, the defendant forfeits the right to submit his
written statement and the Court cannot allow the same to be taken on record
but, these provisions are intended to provide the consequences in relation to a
defendant who omits to perform his part in progress of the suit as envisaged by
the rules of procedure and are not intended to override all other provisions of
CPC like those of Section 10....”, added the bench.
Noting
that the written statement had already been prepared and notarised by the
appellant, the Court ordered that they deserved to be taken on record and
the Trial Court deserved to be directed to proceed with the matter in
accordance with law thereafter. With this view, the appeal came to be allowed.
- [Prakash Corporates v. Dee Vee Projects
Ltd. (2022) 136 taxmann.com 315 (SC)]
The Supreme Court extended
the limitation period till 28.02.2022 in view of the outbreak of COVID-19 in an
application filed in Suo Motu writ petition which the court initiated in
2020 during the early days of the pandemic
A special bench comprising Chief Justice of India NV Ramana,
Justice L Nageswara Rao and Justice Surya Kant said, “the period from
15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation
as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.”
The order has been passed in furtherance of the application filed
by Supreme Court Advocates On Record Association’s (SCAORA) application
seeking revival of order of the Supreme Court dated March 23, 2020 extending
the statutory limitation period owing to the prevailing pandemic situation. The
bench has further noted that “Consequently, the balance period of limitation
remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from
01.03.2022.”
Supreme Court order Miscellaneous application no. 21 of 2022 reviving
the extension of limitation period for judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.
Taking cognizance of the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic, Supreme Court
had extended the limitation period (prescribed under general or special laws)
in respect of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings w.e.f. 15 March 2020 till
2 October 2021. Considering the spread of new Covid-19 variant, SC has restored
the extension granted earlier and issued following directions:
·
Period from 15 March 2020 till 28
February 2022 shall be excluded for computation of limitation period
(prescribed under any general or special laws) in respect of all judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings.
·
Consequently, the balance limitation
period remaining as on 3 October 2021, if any, shall become available w.e.f. 1
March 2022.
·
In cases where the limitation period had
expired between 15 March 2020 and 28 February 2022, a period of 90 days from 1
March 2022 shall be granted, regardless of the actual balance of limitation
period remaining as on 1 March 2022.
·
However, if the actual balance of
limitation period as on 1 March 2022 is greater than 90 days, such longer
period shall apply.
The
Supreme Court has further directed:
(i) In cases where the limitation would have expired during the
period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance
period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of
90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation
remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer
period shall apply.
(ii) It is further clarified that the period from 15.03.2020 till
28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under
Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section
12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe
period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer
limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone
delay) and termination of proceedings. – [Miscellaneous application no. 21
of 2022 - Date of order : 10.01.2022 (SC)]
NOTE
It is relevant to note that Central Board
of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) vide Circular No. 157/13/2021-GST dated 20.07.2021
clarified that the Supreme Court order is not applicable to any proceedings
under GST laws other than appeals, revision and rectification.
Delay
in filing the Special Leave Petition cannot be the reason to deny just and fair
compensation to the claimants - Liberal approach should be adopted in such like
matters
In
this context, it was observed that we can take judicial notice of the fact that
villagers in our country are by and large illiterate and are not conversant
with the intricacies of law. They are usually guided by their co-villagers, who
are familiar with the proceedings in the courts or the advocates with whom they
get in touch for redressal of their grievance. Affidavits filed in support of
the applications for condonation of delay are usually drafted by the advocates
on the basis of half-baked information made available by the affected persons.
Therefore, in the acquisition matters involving claim for award of just
compensation, the court should adopt a liberal approach and either grant time
to the party to file better affidavit to explain delay or suo motu take
cognizance of the fact that large number of other similarly situated persons
who were affected by the determination of compensation by the Land Acquisition
Officer or the Reference Court have been granted relief. – [Imrant Lal v. Land
Acquisition Collector (2014) 14 SCC 133 (SC)]
“Even though
limitation harshly affects rights of a party, but it has to be applied with all
its rigor when prescribed by a statute”
The Supreme Court has gone on to
state that equity is not a ground to extend the limitation period by condoning
the delay if there is no “sufficient cause”. The reason assigned by the Supreme
Court is that an unlimited period of litigation would have an impact of
rendering a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, depriving a successful party
of enjoying the fruits of litigation as a finality to a judgment is postponed.
– [Basawaraj & Anr vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746
(2013) 14 SCC 81 (SC)]
In the case of Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer,
it was held by the Hon’ble Court that the limitation Act applies to courts and
not to quasi-judicial authorities. Furthermore, it was held that the law of limitation
may possibly austerely affect a particular party but, nonetheless has to be
applied when the statute prescribes the same. Moreover, that the Court(s) are
devoid of the power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds,
even if the statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party. –
[Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765
(SC)]
In
the case of Samiyathal v. Tahsildar, Apex Court took cognizance of the
fact that many landowners may not have been able to seek intervention of the
Court for grant of enhanced compensation due to illiteracy, poverty and
ignorance and issued direction that those who have not filed special leave
petition should be given enhanced compensation. Time has come today where no
unnecessary indulgence is required to be shown to any litigant in general. It
only delays of the conclusion of the proceedings between two set of parties and
validates and ratifies the inaction or want of bonafide or negligence on the
part of the litigant in approaching the court late. – [Samiyathal v.
Tahsildar [C.A. No. 5335 of 2013, Dated 05.07.2013 (SC)]
‘Sufficient Cause’ must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays preferring appeals are required to condone
It
was held that the Government decision is not a decision of an individual and
the ultimate analysis is whether public interest would suffer. Proof of
sufficient cause is condition precedent for the exercise of extraordinary
restriction vested in the court. Length of delay in filing the appeal or
revision is not material but the sufficiency of cause and shortness of delay is
one of the circumstances which will be taken into account. The expression of
sufficient cause is adequately elastic. ‘Sufficient Cause’ must receive a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays
preferring appeals are required to condone. – [State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao
& Ors. AIR 2005 SC 2191 : 2005 (3) SCC 752 (SC)]
Leave
is granted limited to the question of the condonation of delay of 1418 days in
preferring the appeal
In the case of Radha Krishna Rai v. Allahabad Bank & Ors.,
there existed a delay of 1418 days, which naturally caused the expiry of the
limitation period. Nevertheless, the appellant appealed that he was acting
under an incorrect impression that the appeal was filed and was pending before
the Hon’ble High Court, which was later disproven. It was discovered that no
such appeal was filed by his counsel. The Hon’ble Court held that although the
delay extended for a prolonged period of time, there existed sufficient cause
as the appellant had no intentions to cause a delay. Therefore, the application
made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was accepted. – [Radha Krishna Rai v.
Allahabad Bank & Ors. (2000) 9 SCC 733 (SC)]
Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties.
The provision contemplates that the court has to go in the
position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to
have resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be
recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case as sufficient. Sole
criteria is to the acceptability of the explanation; the duration of the period
of delay does not matter. There have been cases where a slight postponement or
delay in filing the application has not been approved due to unacceptable
reasons; whereas, on the other hand, the court has neglected years of
postponement or delay as the reason provided was adequate and satisfactory. The
Supreme Court expanded the scope and ambit of law of limitation and elucidated
as follows:
It
is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be
exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no
matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay
of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable
explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be
condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the
explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion
and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in
revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly
untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when
the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court
would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open
to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the
conclusion of the lower court. - [N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7
SCC 123 (SC)]
Their
Lordships has cautioned the High Court not to condone the delay in a mechanical
manner while deciding the issue relating to application filed under Section 5
of the Limitation Act. Relevant portion from the case of P. K.
Ramachandran is reproduced as under:-
“3. It would be noticed from a perusal of
the impugned order that the court has not recorded any satisfaction that the
explanation for the delay was either reasonable or satisfactory, which is an
essential prerequisite to condonation of delay.”……..
“6. Law of Limitation may harshly affect
a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extent the period of
limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court
was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot
be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set
aside.”…..
The Supreme Court while reversing the order passed by
High Court which had condoned 565 days delay in filing an appeal by the State
against the decree of the Sub- Court in an arbitration application, observed
that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to
be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts
have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. There lies no scope for filing the appeal and after the assessment about
the same by the committee, the High Court has erred in passing the order. The
limitation period cannot be extended by the Courts unreasonably and without any
proper explanation. The impugned order by the passed High Court of Kerala was
not judicious and is thus set aside. The present appeal in the apex court is
granted while the Miscellaneous First Appeal by the respondent stands
disposed of… – [P.
K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 (SC)]
In
Special Tehsildar & Acquisition Kerala v. K. V. Ayisumma, the Apex Court
held that it is very difficult to explain the day-to-day delay in case of
Government. - [Special Tehsildar & Acquisition Kerala v. K. V. Ayisumma AIR
1996 SC 2750 (SC)]
In
State of Haryana v. Chandra Moni, the
Apex Court held that Government is an impersonal machinery and the expression
“sufficient cause” should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented
approach rather than technical detection of “sufficient cause”. – [State
of Haryana v. Chandra Moni AIR 1996 SC 1623 (SC)]
Court should adopt liberal and justice
oriented approach for the purposes of condonation of delay
In the case of Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag and others v. Mst. Katiji and others their Lordships of Apex Court held that court should adopt liberal and
justice oriented approach for the purposes of condonation of delay. Relevant
portion from the case of Mst. Katiji (supra) is reproduced as under:-
(1)
Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
(2)
Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out
at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when
delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided
on merits after hearing the parties.
(3)
“Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach
should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine
must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
(4)
When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each
other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side
cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay.
(5)
There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of
culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to
benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
(6)
It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to
legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing
injustice and is expected to do so.” – [Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag and others v. Mst. Katiji and others 1987 (2) SCC 107 (SC)]
Grave
miscarriage of justice to be ground of condonation of delay
If
the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it
would be a ground to condone the delay in prefering the appeal. – [O.P.
Kathpalia vs. Lakhmir Singh, (1984) 4 SCC 66 : AIR 1984 SC 1744 (SC)]
Meaning
of expression “sufficient cause” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act
It
has been held by the Supreme Court that discretion given by Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 should not be defined or crystallized so as to convert a
discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression “sufficient
cause” should receive a liberal construction. – [New India Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Mishra, AIR 1976 SC 237 (SC)]
Sufficient
cause should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice
when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafide is imputable to a party
The expression “sufficient cause”
has not been defined in the Act. It is, however, very wide, comprehensive, and
elastic in nature. It is also construed liberally by courts to advance the
cause of justice. Such discretion, however, should be exercised judiciously. “Sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if
negligence, in-action or want of bona fides is attributable to the party in
delay. – [State of West Bengal v. Howrah Municipality (1972) 1 SCC 366 : AIR 1972 SC 749 (SC)]
Mistake by counsel not always a
sufficient ground
There is no general proposition that mistake of
counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It It is
always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to
cover an ulterior purpose. In that case it was held that the mistake committed
by the Counsel was bona fide and it was not tainted by any malafide motive. – [Lala
Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, 1969 (2) SCC 770 (SC)]
For delay to be condoned, the party will have to show sufficient cause not only for not filing the appeal on the last day but to explain the delay made thereafter day by day
The
Supreme Court, while interpreting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, laid down
the following two important considerations which
have to be kept in mind while construing the section:
In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act), it is relevant to bear in mind
two important considerations.
Firstly, the right established in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties after the period of limitation for making an appeal is over, should not be normally hampered
In
other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired, the
decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the
decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the
decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed.
Secondly, the discretion to condone delay and admit the
appeal is given to the court, which cannot be undermined. This is done with an
aim to advance substantial justice
The
other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for
excusing delay is shown, discretion is given to the court to condone delay and
admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court
in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised
to advance substantial justice. - [Ramlal v.
Rewa Coalfields Ltd AIR 1962 SC 361 (SC)]
Time consume in obtaining copy of decree & condonation of delay in filing appeal
Where a decree is not drawn up immediately or soon
after a judgment is pronounced and a litigant feeling aggrieved by the decision
applies for the certified copy of the judgment and the decree before the decree
drawn up, as he had done all that he could and has made a proper application
for obtaining the necessary copies, the time requisite for obtaining the copies
must necessarily include not only the time taken for the actual supply of the
certified copy of the decree but also for the drawing up of the decree itself.
The time taken by the office or the court in drawing up a decree after a
litigant has applied for its certified copy on judgment being pronounced, would
be treated as a part of the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the
said decree. Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC provide for appeal from decree
passed by a court of original jurisdiction and on appeal, by a court subordinate
to the High Court respectively. Neither of these Sections permit appeal against
judgment. However, where decree is not drawn within 15 days of the judgment and
decree, Order 20, rule 6A permits filing of appeal with a copy of the last
paragraph of the judgment which by fiction is treated as decree. Therefore, the
appeal lies from the decree and not from the judgment although the word
“decision” is used in sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the CPC. – [Jagat
Dhish Bhargava vs. Jawahar Lal Bhargava, AIR 1961 SC 832 (Three-Judge Bench)]
Sufficient cause must cover the whole period of delay
It was held that “sufficient
cause must cover the whole period of delay”. It shall be incumbent upon the
party to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal or making application within prescribed time. Relevant portion from the
case of Sitaram Ramcharan (supra) is reproduced as under:-
“It cannot be disputed that in dealing with the question of condoning delay under S.5 of the Limitation Act the party has to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed time, and this was always been understood to mean that the explanation has to cover the whole of the period of delay.” – [Sitaram Ramcharan and others v. M.N. Nagrashana Authority AIR 1960 SC 260 (SC)]
