The term ‘Sufficient cause’ - Certain ratios laid down by the Court

The term ‘Sufficient cause’ seems to have a wide and comprehensive import. Whether or not the furnished reason would constitute a sufficient cause will depend on facts of each case. There is no prescribed formula which can be applied for accepting or rejecting the explanation provided for proving the delay. In a case where a party has been negligent, the approach cannot be the same and liberal interpretation of the term will be discouraged. In normal circumstances, acceptance of the reason furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception, more so when no negligence can be attributed to the defaulting party

The term sufficient cause has nowhere been defined in the Act; however, it seems that the courts have construed it quite liberally in order to meet the ends of justice, so much so that meritorious matters are not disregarded solely on the basis of a slight delay.

 The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be construed too liberally, merely because the party in default is the Government. It is no doubt true that whether it is a Government or a private party, the provisions of law applicable are the same, unless the statute itself makes any distinction. But it cannot also be gainsaid that the same consideration that will be shown by courts to a private party when he claims the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should also be available to the State.The words "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party.

It is a well settled position of law as enunciated by Supreme Court that while deciding an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, a justice oriented approach is required to be adopted.

In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 : AIR 1987 SC 1353, the Supreme Court has held -

“… The expression `sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy.”

On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not disregard the fact that by not taking steps within the stipulated time, a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be undermined by condoning delay in a routine like manner.

It is trite law that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, it is for the applicant to explain that there was “sufficient cause” for the delay. It had been consistently held that “sufficient cause” would mean that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part, but must have acted diligently and not remained inactive.

The remedy provided under the Limitations Act to condone the delay where a sufficient cause has been provided for the same should be construed liberally in order to meet the ends of justice. According to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, any appeal or application may be accepted even after the limitation period for the same is over, if the appellant/applicant assures the court that he had a sufficient cause for not being able to file the appeal/application during the limitation period. If the court is satisfied, such delay in filing the appeal/application can be condoned irrespective of the party being a state or a private party.

It should also be kept in mind that the law of limitation in itself was founded on the principles on public policy in order to ensure that the parties approach the court for vindication of their rights without causing unreasonable delay.

Meaning of the word “sufficient cause”

Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man.

In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”.

However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.

According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 24, p. 181:“330. Policy of Limitation Acts. The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that Persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence”.

5318 days appeal-filing delay not condonable; Assessee lacked sufficient cause, acted casually

Assessee-Individual, engaged in the business of selling products under the brand name of Manick Chand Gutka / Pan Masala, was a consignment agent for his principal Dhariwal Industries. The Assessee was intercepted by the police and was found carrying a sum of Rs. 50 Lacs, which the Assessee claimed to have collected from retailers as the sale proceeds in the regular course. The police authorities rejected Assessee’s explanation, filed an FIR and arrested the Assessee seizing the cash in his custody. The Revenue was informed about the seizure of the cash, accordingly, the Revenue issued a warrant for requisition of assets under Section 132A against the Assessee and delivery of the cash to the IT Department was ordered by the Trial Court, which was confirmed by the co-ordinate bench. Revenue passed an order for block assessment from 01.04.1996 to 31.03.2002 and 01.02.2002 to 18.02.2003, which was confirmed by the CIT(A). 

ITAT, vide impugned order, dismissed Assessee’s appeal confirming CIT(A) order sustaining the addition of Rs. 50 Lacs as undisclosed income in Assessee’s hand. Against the ITAT order the Assessee preferred the review petition which came to be dismissed, thereafter Assessee filed a rectification petition under Section 254 which was also dismissed by the ITAT. After that the Assessee filed an appeal/rectification petition with the CIT(A) which was dismissed by holding that the appeal was already dismissed by the ITAT, thus, there was no room for rectification in the absence of any direction by the ITAT. Against dismissal by the CIT(A) Assessee once again filed an appeal before ITAT, which was dismissed. Aggrieved, Assessee filed an application praying for condonation of the delay of 5318 days in filing the appeal before the High Court against ITAT order confirming CIT(A) order sustaining the addition of Rs.50 Lacs as undisclosed income in Assessee’s hand.

High Court noted that the ITAT order dated 09.05.2008 was challenged by the Assessee by way of review and rectification petition before the ITAT, which was dismissed on 04.11.2010 and 27.09.2013. Further noted that instead of filing the appeal against the ITAT order, the Assessee chose to file a rectification petition before the CIT(A), and on rejection of the same, Assessee once again filed an appeal before the ITAT. Remarks that the complacency in the approach of the Assessee does not inspire confidence, but reflects apathy and lack of bona fide. Finds that Assessee could not set out any convincing reason for condonation of the delay of 5318 days. Reiterated the trite law that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, it is for the applicant to explain that there was ‘sufficient cause’ for the delay. 

High Court explained that the term sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part, but must have acted diligently and not remained inactive. Relies on Supreme Court ruling in Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81 and Ajay Dabre v. Pyare Ram (2023) SCC Online SC 92 and observes that the discretion to condone the delay ought to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. Observed that if it is found that the party seeking condonation has been negligent, not vigilant and lacking bona fide, the Court would not come to the rescue of such litigants. Found the that, “The reasons set out in the affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone the delay of 5318 days i.e., nearly 14 years are unconvincing and do not furnish any cause much less “sufficient cause” for condoning the delay in filing the appeal, instead reveal a callous attitude and a casual approach in availing the right of appeal”; Relies on Supreme Court judgment in Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer (2008) 17 SCC 448, wherein it was held that the Courts help those, who are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights. Thus dismisses Assessee’s application for condonation of delay of 5318 days. [In favour of revenue] – [M. Srinivasulu v. ACIT [TS-817-HC-2023(MAD)] – Date of Judgement : 21.12.2023 (Mad.)]

In the case of Ajay Dabre v. Pyare Ram :

“13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:

“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” – [Ajay Dabre v. Pyare Ram 2023 SCC Online SC 92 (SC)]

The word “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of Limitation Act should adopt a liberal and justice-oriented construction to advance justice...

The facts of the case are that the plaintiffs filed a civil suit for declaration of title and for permanent injunction in respect of the land. The Trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs, against which the plaintiffs preferred an appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code i.e. CPC before the first appellate court which was barred by limitation, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed stating that the plaintiffs preferred an application under Order 43 Rule 1(U) of the CPC before the High Court that has been dismissed. Thereafter appeal was preferred before the first appellate court which was rejected being devoid of merits. Aggrieved by this second appeal was filed under Section 100 of CPC.

Counsel for the appellants submitted that first appellate Court is absolutely unjustified in not condoning the delay of 72 days as the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, as such, the application for condonation of delay ought to have been allowed by the first appellate Court.

The Court relied on judgment N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 wherein it was held

“11. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. the object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

 12.  A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumptions that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice”

The Court thus observed that the meaning of “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 held that the Courts should adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach and condoned the delay of four days in filing appeal, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Court thus held that “it is quite vivid that plaintiffs’ suit for declaration of title and for permanent injunction was dismissed against which plaintiffs filed an appeal along with an application for condonation of delay for condoning the delay of 72 days in filing the appeal offering an explanation that they filed MA before this Court which was dismissed as withdrawn on 08.5.2008. It is not disputed that against the judgment and decree of the trial Court, an appeal under Section 96 of CPC before the first appellate Court would lie and appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(U) of CPC would not lie, therefore, the appellants/plaintiffs were entitled for the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act as such, in the considered opinion of this Court, sufficient cause has been shown by the plaintiffs for the delay of 72 days in filing the appeal.” In view of the above, impugned order was set aside and appeal allowed. - [Ramvriksha Gond v. Babulal Gond, 2021 SCC OnLine Chh 39, decided on 14.01.2021 (Chhattisgarh High Court)]

In the case of Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81 (SC):

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. – [Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81 (SC)]

Court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Courts help those who are vigilant and “do not slumber over their rights”

In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, it is observed as under:

"The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as "statutes of peace". An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy”. – [Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer (2008) 17 SCC 448 (SC)]

In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan 2008 (10) JT 179 : 2008 (11) SCALE 455, the court clarified that the term ‘sufficient cause’ should be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay

The Supreme Court emphasized that “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 should be interpreted liberally to advance substantial justice. The Court held that the delay should not be presumed to be deliberate and that the court should show consideration to the party seeking condonation of delay.... By taking an over scrupulous approach to the matter, the explanation furnished should not be dismissed especially when stakes are high, causing considerable harm and irreparable damage to the party against whom the suit terminates and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decisions on merits. Ideally, the courts should strike a balance between the subsequent impact of the order it was going to pass upon the parties either way. This approach was taken by the court in the case Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao (2002) 3 SCC 195.

In the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, the court elaborated on the point that in the cases of condonation of delay, the acceptability of the explanation is the sole criterion; the duration of delay does not matter. There have been cases where a slight delay in filing the application has not been condoned due to unacceptable reasons; whereas on the other hand, the court has neglected years of delay as the reason provided was satisfactory. In judgment N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy wherein it was held

“11. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. the object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumptions that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice... ” – [N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy 1998 7 SCC 123 (SC)]

What constitutes sufficient cause

What constitutes sufficient cause has been considered in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Others and it was held that “The Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matter on “merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice - that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matter instituted in this court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that -

(i)     Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

(ii)   Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

(iii) “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, commonsense and pragmatic manner.

(iv) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay.

 (v) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.

(vi)  It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. – [Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Others (1987) 167 ITR 471 : 2 SCC 107 : AIR 1987 SC 1353 (SC)]

In Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, the Supreme Court had held that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. In that case it was held that the mistake committed by the counsel was bona fide and it was not tainted by any mala fide motive. The Supreme Court observed that dismissal of an application by the High Court under Section 5 of Limitation Act and refusal to condone the delay on the ground that the advocate of 34 years standing could not make a mistake in law, was unjustified and a mistake of a counsel in certain circumstances can be taken into account in condoning the delay although there was no general preposition that the mistake of a counsel is itself a sufficient ground. The Supreme Court further observed that if there was nothing to show that the error committed by the advocate was tainted by a malafide motive, in such circumstances there was justification in extending the time under Section 5 of Limitation Act. – [Mata Din v. A. Narayanan 1969 (2) SCC 770 (SC)]

Difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause”

In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, the Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof that that of “sufficient cause”. – [Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 (SC)]

The Supreme Court in the case Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. while interpreting Section 5 laid down a few propositions. There are two important considerations which have to be kept in mind while construing the section. Firstly, the right established in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties after the period of limitation for making an appeal is over, should not be normally hampered. Secondly, the discretion to condone delay and admit the appeal is given to the court, which cannot be undermined. This is done with an aim to advance substantial justice. – [Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 (SC)]

As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, “section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant.”