Monday, 1 November 2021

Allowability of Litigation expenses under the provisions of Income Tax Act, 1961

The income-tax laws in India contemplate deduction of expenses incurred in the carrying on of business. In running a business, which involves compliance with many statutory laws, and dealings with different organisations and people, litigation is a common incident. Litigation expenses incurred for business purposes are generally deductible as “ordinary and necessary” expenses of the business. Since almost the entire law relating to admissibility of Litigation expenses in India is based either on executive instructions or is judge-made law.

Object of litigation - Significance of

For claiming deduction for legal expenses, the object or purpose of the litigation has to be seen from the facts of each case. In deciding whether an expenditure is allowable as a deduction under section 37(1), the important thing to be seen is whether the expenditure has been made as a measure of business expediency or for the purpose of protecting or safeguarding the business itself or business assets of the taxpayer.

True test in respect of allowing the litigation expenses

For deciding whether any expenditure is allowable as deduction under section 37 of 1961 Act, the essential requirement must in every case be as to whether the expenditure was either in reality or as a measure of business expediency necessary either for the purpose of the assessee including goodwill or in connection with some transaction or activity which is directly and substantially connected with the running of the business of the assessee or is intimately connected with the assessee’s business activities. Such expenses must necessarily pertain to the business itself and must not be an expenditure merely connected with any activity, however remote or ancillary.

Thus, true test in respect of allowing the litigation expenses should be whether the litigation concerned, affects carrying on of the business or the conduct of the business of the assessee-company as a going concern. If the main purpose of the litigation was to determine who would run a particular company or who should be incharge of running the company, the litigation expenses may not as such affect the carrying on of the business of the assessee. To justify the allowance, the court reasoned that the main and primary purpose of the suit which petitioner defended was for an accounting and any question of title was merely incidental thereto. There must be a proximate relationship between the matter out of which the legal expenses arise and the business of the taxpayer.

Expenditure incurred for a purpose which is an offence or prohibited by law cannot be allowed as deduction [Explanation 1 to Section 37(1)]

A bare perusal of Explanation to section 37(1) indicates that incurring of any expenditure for a purpose which is an offence or prohibited by law cannot be allowed as deduction.

Explanation 1 to section 37(1) provides that any expenditure incurred by an assessee for any purpose which is an offence or which is prohibited by law shall not be deemed to have been incurred for the purpose of business or profession and no deduction or allowance shall be made in respect of such expenditure.

Text of Explanation 1 to section 37(1)

Explanation 1. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that any expenditure incurred by an assessee for any purpose which is an offence or which is prohibited by law shall not be deemed to have been incurred for the purpose of business or profession and no deduction or allowance shall be made in respect of such expenditure.

There existed a nexus of expenditure with offence

Mandate of the Explanation to section 37(1) is crystal clear that, any expenditure incurred for any purpose which is an offence or which is prohibited by law cannot be allowed as deduction. It does not make any difference, whether expenditure is direct or indirect. So long as there exists a nexus of the expenditure with the offence, it will continue to be hit by the Explanation.

Language of Section 37 does not make any distinction between civil litigation and criminal litigation

Language of Section 37 does not make any distinction between civil litigation and criminal litigation. In fact, expenses incurred in connection with litigation are not separately dealt with under that provision. It makes. no difference whether the proceedings are civil or criminal. All that the court has to see is whether the legal expenses were incurred by the assessee in his character as a trader; in other words, whether the transaction in respect of which proceedings are taken arose out of and was incidental to assessee’s business. Further we have to see whether the expenditure in question was bona fide incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business

Where expenditures are allowable under section 37(1) from Business Income 

Deductibility of litigation expenses is not straightforward and depends on who is paying these and in what context. Deductibility of these expenses depend on the taxpayer’s motive or purpose for incurring the expense in question. When a legal expense is incurred in relation to the operation of a business to produce assessable income, it is generally allowable as a deduction. Exceptions are when the legal fee is capital, domestic or private in nature, if it is specifically excluded by another section of income tax legislation, or is incurred in earning exempt and non-assessable non-exempt income.

EXAMPLES OF ALLOWABLE EXPENDITURES:

·          Litigation expenses in protecting the trade or business.

·          Litigation expenditure must arise in the course of or by reason of the taxpayer’s ordinary trading operations.

·          Litigation expenses which are “ordinary and necessary” (i) to carry on a trade or business or (ii) for the production or collection of income, for the management of income-producing property, or in connection with determining tax liability may be deducted currently.

·          Litigation expenses incurred in order to defend or maintain an existing title to the business asset.

·          Expenses on litigation (whether civil or criminal) if incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business.

·          The legal expenses incurred did not create or enhance any asset, they did not bring about any advantage for the enduring benefit of trade, and they were more closely related to the appellant’s income-earning operations than to its income-earning structure.

·          Litigation expenses for making agreements, various deeds, etc.

EXAMPLES OF NOT ALLOWABLE EXPENDITURES:

·          Litigation expenses incurred in connection with purely personal activities which have no profit-seeking motive are non-deductible under section 37;

·          Litigation expenditure incurred for curing any defect in title of assets or completing that title.

·          Litigation expenditure is not of a capital nature;

·          Litigation expenditure is not incurred in respect of any claim made against the taxpayer for the payment of damages or compensation;

·          Litigation expenditure is not incurred in respect of any claim made by the taxpayer for the payment to him of any

Legal expenses incurred by assessee-company to protect directors/shareholders in their individual capacity, not for their conduct in carrying out business of assessee could not be allowed as business expenditure under section 37(1)

There was a dispute between two groups of shareholders, primarily for management and control of assessee-company. Assessee-company incurred legal expenses for purpose of defending its directors/shareholders in respect of complaints filed against them by another group of shareholders. Assessing Officer disallowed such expenses holding that same were not incurred by assessee-company for business purpose. Since legal expenses were incurred so as to protect directors/shareholders of assessee-company in respect of complaints filed against them in their individual capacity and not in respect of their conduct in course of carrying on business of assessee-company, same could not be allowed as business expenditure under section 37(1). [In favour of revenue] (Related Assessment years : 2005-06, 2007-08 to 2009-10) – [National Refinery (P.) Ltd. v. CIT (2020) 424 ITR 267 : 272 Taxman 160 : 114 taxmann.com 614 (Bom.)]

Where High Court upheld Tribunal’s order holding that legal/settlement expenses incurred by assessee in his capacity of managing director of company ‘M’ could not be claimed as deduction against income earned by exercising legal profession in his individual capacity, SLP filed against said order was to be dismissed

Assessee was a managing director of Company ‘M’. He stood personal guarantee in respect of loan taken by company ‘M’. On account of default in repayment of said loan, assessee in capacity of lawyer, entered into settlement with banks and paid agreed amount. Subsequently, assessee filed his return wherein he claimed deduction of legal expenses in respect of aforesaid settlement against income generated through legal profession. Assessee’s claim was rejected on ground that said expenditure was of personal nature. Tribunal upheld order passed by revenue authorities. - High Court confirmed Tribunal’s order.

It is urged on behalf of the assessee that if the litigation expenses claimed under Section 37 of the Act were not paid it would have been impossible for him to carry on his profession as an advocate and that in these circumstances, the amount was wholly and exclusively laid out for business. He also cited Shanti Bhushan (supra) to say that there could be circumstance for the expenses claimed by a professional, though seemingly personal, entitled deduction under Section 37 of the Act. What is evident from the discussion of facts by the lower authorities in this case is that the appellant initially was a business entrepreneur, i.e. managing director of M/s Indian Magnetics Ltd. That assessee's liability led to the appellant in his capacity as the guarantor and entrepreneur, discharging its debt. The discharge of that liability was claimed by him to be business expenditure in relation to subsequent income generated through legal profession. In our opinion, such claim is clearly inadmissible. The kind of expenditure which a legal professional can legitimately and justly claim is entirely different from the basic expenditure which a commercial entity can claim. Moreover, the commonality sought to be urged, i.e. the persona of the assessee that obscures the fact is that the hat donned by the assessee in the past was of a business entrepreneur whereas he is now a legal professional; crossing of line is impermissible as the law stands today. On facts, SLP filed against order of High Court was to be dismissed. [In favour of revenue] – [Satinder Kapur v. ACIT (2019) 266 Taxman 377 : 110 taxmann.com 25 (SC)]

Where assessee-company claimed deduction of legal and professional expenses incurred in relation to buyback of shares of company from its shareholders, since said expenditure would not in any manner enhance capital structure of assessee company, expenditure in question being revenue in nature was eligible for deduction under section 37(1)

During relevant year, assessee company debited legal and professional expenses of Rs.10,25,500/-incurred in relation to buyback of shares of company from its shareholders which pertained to reduction of share capital of company. Assessing Officer disallowed such expenditure on ground that expenditure incurred partook character of capital nature. Tribunal opined that assessee had claimed deduction in respect of expenditure incurred in connection with carrying out buy back scheme and buyback of shares would not in any manner enhance capital structure of assessee company. Tribunal thus taking a view that expenses incurred were in connection with existing business of assessee company, allowed assessee’s claim for deduction. Since assessee claimed deduction in respect of expenditure incurred for proceeding of implementation of buyback of shares which would not in any manner enhance capital structure of assessee, assessee’s claim was rightly allowed by Tribunal. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2004-05) – [PCIT v. Bayer Vapi (P) Ltd. (2019) 264 Taxman 182 : 106 taxmann.com 395 (Guj.)]

Where expenditure was incurred by assessee towards legal fee and other litigation charges to protect his business interests in relation to mining lease and not to acquire mining lease or to get rid of a defect in title and same did not create any capital asset, deduction was allowable under section 37, same being revenue expenditure

Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - In year 2006, certain lands were leased out to assessee for purpose of mining iron ore by Department of Mines and Geology. Assessee was working on said lease as a lessee of State Government. Grant of lease to assessee was challenged in writ petitions filed before instant court by two parties. Assessee contended that he incurred expenditure towards legal fee and other allied expenditure in order to defend and sustain his mining rights in respect of contentious lease. Assessing Officer not being satisfied with assessee’s contention, held that expenditure had to be construed to be capital expenditure, as it was an expenditure having nexus to earning of profits in business. Accordingly, he disallowed assessee’s claim. Since expenditure was incurred by assessee towards legal fee and other litigation charges to protect his business interests in relation to mining lease and not to acquire mining lease or to get rid of a defect in title and same did not create any capital asset, deduction was allowable within meaning of section 37(1), same being revenue expenditure. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment years : 2008-09 and 2009-10) – [DCIT, Bellary v. B. Kumara Gowda (2017) 396 ITR 386 : 249 Taxman 377 : 83 taxmann.com 370 (Karn.)]

Legal fee paid by assessee to protect and maintain its right in a registered software was eligible for deduction under section 37(1)

During relevant year, assessee paid legal fee to Hammonds, UK, to protect and maintain its right in a registered software. Assessing Officer rejected assessee’s claim for deduction of said fee on ground that legal fee was exorbitant and far in excess to compensation received from entity, which had infringed its rights in registered software. Tribunal, however, allowed assessee’s claim. Since registered software was a property of assessee-company which could earn revenue for assessee from time-to-time as and when it licenced its use by third parties, expenditure incurred to protect its right in said software was to be allowed as deduction notwithstanding fact that legal fee paid was more than compensation received by assessee. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 2005-06) – [PCIT v. Managed Information Services (P) Ltd. (2017) 246 Taxman 409 : 80 taxmann.com 65 (Mad.)]

Legal charges incurred for defending criminal proceedings which has get nothing to do with Assessee profession is of personal nature and such expenditure cannot be allowed against income from business and Profession 

Assessee, a film actor was implicated in some criminal proceedings. He incurred legal expenses and claimed deduction of same from his business income. Assessing Officer denied deduction treating said expenses to be personal in nature. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee's claim. On revenue’s appeal :

Held : It was found that the expenditure on legal charges were incurred for making the payments to eminent criminal lawyers for de- fending the assessee from criminal proceedings. However, no evidence was filed before the Assessing Officer or even Commissioner (Appeals) to show that criminal complaint arose out of the film shooting. The assessee simply gave evasive reply when confronted with the question that whether criminal proceedings arose out of any incident during the shooting of film. The criminal proceedings are always filed against individual. This has got nothing to do with assessee’s profession. Therefore, the expenditure was purely of the personal nature and such expenditure could not be allowed against the income from business and profession. Therefore, the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) in this respect was to be set aside and the order of the Assessing Officer was to be restored. (Related Assessment : years 2003-04 and 2004-05) – [DCIT v. Salman Khan (2011) 137 TTJ 15 : 130 ITD 81 : 9 Taxmann.com 74 (ITAT Mumbai)]

Deductibility of legal expenses will depend on nature and purpose of legal proceeding in relation to business whose profits are under computation and cannot be affected by final outcome of that proceeding

Expense incurred in defending criminal proceedings are generally regarded as personal expenses.  However, deductibility of such expenses will depend on nature and purpose of legal proceeding in relation to business whose profits are under computation and cannot be affected by final outcome of that proceeding. Assessee made payment to an advocate for representing assessee against order passed by Directorate of Enforcement, for alleging that assessee had made contraventions of provisions of section 9(1)(c). Assessee’s claim for deduction in respect of said expenses was disallowed by authorities below.

The principles that can be culled out from the various decided cases are that generally expenses incurred in defending criminal proceedings are regarded as personal expenses. The deductibility of such expenses will depend on the nature and purpose of the legal proceeding in relation to the business whose profits are under computation and cannot be affected by the final outcome of that proceeding.

In view of the legal principles above, the Assessing Officer was to be directed to verify the purpose for which these expenses were incurred and in case the expenses were in the nature relating to the business of the assessee then the expenses are allowable under section 37(1). After examining the nature of the charges and result of the appeal proceedings, if any, the Assessing Officer was free to consider the amount whether the same was incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of assessee’s business. The expenses could not be allowed as deduction if it was not incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee. Since the facts were required to be verified this issue was also restored to the file of the Assessing Officer to examine the nature of the complaint, the appellate orders and pending proceedings, if any, and to arrive at a decision accordingly. This issue was to be restored to the file of the Assessing Officer directed to verify purpose for which these expenses were incurred and in case expenses were in nature relating to business of assessee then expenses were allowable under section 37(1). (Related Assessment years : 2004-05 and 2005-06) - [Vivek P Talwar v. ACIT(C) (2010) 8 Taxmann.com 268 (ITAT Mumbai)]

Assessee’s claim for litigation expenses incurred in connection with a suit instituted against a person for ejectment/possession and recovery of charges for use and occupation, being trespassers of building, as tenancy stood terminated, was disallowed by Assessing Officer on ground that expenses were not allowable under head ‘Income from house property’- Commissioner (Appeals) allowed such expenses at 6 per cent of Annual Letting Value under section 24 - Said expenditure was incurred to protect business interest of assessee and not for purpose of creating, curing or completing assessee’s title as regards property in question, and was, therefore, allow­able as deduction under section 37(1)

Admittedly, the assessee had incurred a sum of Rs. 61,329 as litigation/legal expenses. However, the Assessing Officer had not properly appreciated the position of law. In the instant case, the assessee had incurred the expenses for securing its ‘title’ as regards the said property, which was a capital asset of the assessee-firm. The Assessing Officer had also not appreciated the fact that the said legal expenses were incurred by the assessee-firm for protecting the assessee’s title as regards the said capital asset and had not been incurred for the purpose of creat­ing, curing or completing the assessee’s title as regards the said capital asset and, accordingly, the assessee was entitled to claim the expenses. Both the authorities below had not denied the fact that the expenses in question were incurred to protect the business interest of the assessee and, therefore, it could be safely held that the expenses were definitely of the revenue nature. Furthermore, there was no material on record to contro­vert the above contentions of the assessee. Accordingly, it was to be held that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dalmia Jain & Co. Ltd. v. CIT (1971) 81 ITR 753, the assessee was entitled to claim the entire litigation expenses. The Commissioner (Appeals) was not justified in presuming that only 6 per cent of the A.L.V. (annual letting value) was allowable to the assessee on account of collection charges because the assessee never claimed at any stage that the expenses incurred by it were related to the collection charges. On the other hand, it was the claim of the assessee that the expenses were incurred to protect its interest in the disputed business property. Accordingly, the claim of the assessee had to be allowed. (Related Assessment year : 1985-86) - [Prince Rubber & Plastics v. DCIT (2003) 131 Taxman 130 (ITAT Amritsar)]

Legal expenses for protecting source of income or/and protection of assets have to be deductible. – [State of Tamil Nadu v. C. H. Simpson (1992) 197 ITR 237 (Mad.)]

Expenditure incurred by the assessee in its litigation with the Company Law Board was an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business of the assessee-company

Assessee-company appointed its former managing agents as special officers with almost same powers and same remuneration payable to them in their capacity as managing agents. However, assessee had to incur certain expenditure in litigation with Company Law Board with regard to aforesaid appointments. Assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 29,190 as business expenditure in respect of said litigation expenses. Tribunal allowed assessee’s claim. In view of decision of this court in Rampur Distillery and Chemical Co. Ltd. v. CIT (1983) 140 ITR 725 (All.), Tribunal was justified in allowing assessee’s claim. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment year : 1970-71) – [CIT v. Rampur Distillery & Chemical Co. Ltd. (1991) 190 ITR 327 (All.)]

For defending structure and conduct of business, legal expenses must be allowable

Two shareholders of assessee-company filed suit questioning validity of two special resolutions passed in an extraordinary general meeting adopting new articles of association and appointing managing agents - Assessee claimed deduction of litigation expenses on defending said suit  - Whether said legal expenses were deductible as revenue expenditure.

The Tribunal, finding that the impugned expenditure had been incurred by the assessee wholly and exclusively in respect of its business was not vitiated in any way. The position in law is now well settled that the expenditure which is incurred in resisting an attack on the structure and assets of a company is always an allowable deduction. In the present case the attack was on the validity of the two resolutions which had been passed by the company in its extraordinary general meeting. In defending the validity of the said resolutions, the company was really resisting an attack on its structure and on the conduct of its business which had gone on since 20.10.1947. It could not be contended that the assessee-company incurred the expenses in question in any non-trading capacity. Accordingly, the said expenditure was incurred wholly and exclusively for the business of the company as envisaged in Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 [corresponding to section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961]. Further, the impugned expenses could not be treated as of capital nature and disallowed on that ground. In defending the suit questioning the validity of the said two resolutions, the company was not seeking to bring into existence any capital asset. It was a situation which could be said to be analogous to a serious attack on the company’s title or on its business. It was not an expenditure which was incurred to cure any imperfection in the title or to acquire any new advantage or new assets. In this view of the matter, the impugned expenditure was a permissible deduction. - [CIT v. Muir Mills Co. Ltd. (1984) 148 ITR 418 : (1985) 20 Taxman 132 (All.)]

Legal expenses incurred by the assessee to protect the source of his income or the title to his business or to preserve or maintain his business assets to be regarded as expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of his business and, therefore, allowable as deduction for the purpose of computing the profits for income-tax purpose. – [CIT v. O. P. N. Arunachala Nadar (1983) 141 ITR 620 : 13 Taxman 39 (Mad.)]

Assessee company claimed legal expenses for defending two suits, one filed by its shareholders against its then managing agents and directors for frittering away company’s funds by unwise investments/making commitments for benefit of unsound concerns, and the other filed by another company against its then managing agents and chairman for alleged breach of contract and mismanagement of company’s funds impleading assessee as defendant - It could be said these suits were launched against assessee because of its business activity and, therefore, assessee was entitled to deduction of expenditure incurred on these suits 

The assessee-company, in the assessment for the assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70, claimed deduction of legal expenses incurred by it in defending two suits in which the assessee was impleaded as defendent. One of the suits was filed by two of its shareholders against the then managing agents and directors alleging that the funds or assets of the company were being frittered away and dissipated by unwise investments or by making commitments for the benefit of unsound concerns. The other suit was filed by another company against the then managing agents and chairman in which the allegations primarily related to alleged breach of contract in respect of sale of the managing agents' holdings in the assessee-company and mismanagement of the funds of the company. The ITO disallowed the assessee’s claim for deduction of impugned legal expenses. On appeal, the AAC upheld the ITO’s orders. On further appeal, the Tribunal noted that the first suit was primarily against the assessee and the other dependents were not basically interested in the subject-matter of the suit. Hence, it held that the entire expenses were for the purpose of the assessee’s business. Regarding the second suit also, it held that it was launched against the assessee-company because of its business activity, and hence the litigation expenses were allowable as business expenditure. On reference :

Held : In the instant case, the first suit was primarily concerned with the wise or unwise investments and making commitments for the benefit of unsound concerns. These were the questions which were intrinsically connected with the carrying on of the business of the assessee-company. The second suit was concerned with the question of mismanagement of the funds of the company, that is to say, the question as to how the funds of the company were to be applied. The primary object of the assessee was the carrying on of its business and the litigation affected the carrying on of the business. In view of the nature of the suits, the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the expenses incurred on these suits were allowable expenses. [In favour of the assessee] – [CIT v. Indo-Burmah Petroleum Co. Ltd. (1983) 142 ITR 141 : (1982) 31 CTR 165 : 11 Taxman 13 (Cal.)]

Litigation expenses incurred for evicting tenant to utilise premises for expanding business was allowable deduction

The ITO disallowed the assessee’s claim of Rs. 440 as litigation expenses incurred for evicting a tenant by observing that on being successful it would get a benefit of enduring nature. The ITO stated that the litigation expenses for evicting a tenant in possession of a shop belonging to the assessee could not be said to have been incurred solely and wholly for the purposes of carrying on the assessee’s business. On the contrary, the assessee’s case has been that the extra space shall further enhance its business. It was held that the expense incurred for expected increase in business would come within the ambit of section 37 and should have been allowed. The addition of Rs. 440 is vacated.[Barnala Silk Store v. ITO (1982) 11 Taxman 22 (ITAT Calcutta)]

Assessee-company instituted a suit for ejectment of a sub-tenant and on settlement, sub-tenant surrendered and vacated a portion of its sub-tenancy – Assessee claimed suit expenses as deduction from rental income – ITO held that expense were capital in nature as same were incurred for obtaining possession of a portion of its office premises i.e. a capital asset – On appeal before Tribunal, assessee contended that as a result of said suit sub tenant not only vacated a portion of its sub-tenancy but also increased rent of portion still occupied by it – It was, thus, Contended that said litigation expenses were incurred wholly and exclusively for increasing assessee’s rental income and were an allowable deduction – Tribunal held that expenditure in question was allowable expenditure under head ‘Income from other sources’ - Since ejectment suit had ultimately led to a substantial increase of rental income of assessee, Tribunal’s conclusion that expenses were allowable as deduction under section 57(iii), could not be said to be perverse

The assessee-company carrying on business of share-dealings, had income by way of commission from managing agency and from sub-letting a portion of its office premises. It had sub-let two portions of its office premises to two companies. The assessee filed a suit for ejectment of its sub-tenant. The said suit was ultimately settled and the sub-tenant surrendered and vacate a portion of its sub-tenancy. The assessee's claim for deduction of the suit expenses was rejected on the ground that it was capital in nature as the assessee incurred the same for obtaining possession of a capital asset and not for the purpose of earning any rental income. On appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee contended that as a result of said suit sub tenant not only vacated a portion of its sub tenancy but also increased the rent of the portion still occupied by it. It was, therefore, contended that said litigationexpenses were incurred wholly and exclusively for increasing the rental income of the assessee and was an allowable deduction. The Tribunal held that the expenditure in question was an allowable expenditure under the head ‘Income from other sources’. On reference:

Held : On the relevant facts before it the Tribunal had held that the said expenses were incurred wholly and exclusively for making or earning rental income. The said ejectment suit had ultimately led to a substantial increase of the rental income of the assessee. The only contention of the revenue before the Tribunal was that the said expenses were not directly related to the earning of the rental income but were at the most incidental thereto. The conclusion of the Tribunal on the facts before it that the said expenses were allowable as deduction under section 57(iii), therefore, could not be said to be perverse. [In favour of the assessee] (Related Assessment year : 1965-66) – [CIT v. East India Development Co. (P) Ltd. (1979) 120 ITR 655 (Cal.)]

Assessee was carrying on business of growing and manufacturing tea - It purchased a tea estate at auction and deposited bid money by taking loan from a bank - However, sale was ultimately set aside at instance of original owners of tea estate and deposited amount was refunded to assessee - Tribunal found that transaction entered into by assessee in purchasing tea estate was made in execution or rather in expansion of its tea business and that there was one unit of management and control and business of assessee could not be said to be separate from business that assessee sought to enter into by purchasing said tea estate - Amount of interest paid on loan and traveling and litigation expenses incurred for acquiring said tea estate were allowable as revenue expenditure even though transaction did not ultimately materialise

The assessee-company was carrying on business of growing and manufacturing tea. It purchased a tea garden at an auction sale and it was required to deposit 25 per cent of the bid money immediately on the close of the bid. The assessee took a loan from the Bank against its fixed deposits and deposited the amount with the Court. However, the auction sale was challenged by the original owners of the tea estate and the sale was ultimately set aside. The amount paid by the assessee was accordingly refunded. But the assessee had paid certain sum as interest on the loan. The assessee had also incurred traveling expenses and litigation expenses in connection with the transaction of purchase. The amount of interest and these expenses were held to be capital expenditure and the ITO disallowed them in computation of assessee’s total income. On appeal, the AAC held the amounts to be allowable expenditure. The Revenue's appeal to the Tribunal was dismissed. On reference :

The Tribunal had found that though, ultimately, the sale was set aside at the instance of the owners of the tea estate, the transaction entered into by the assessee was made in execution or rather in expansion of its tea business and that there was one unit of management and control and the business of the assessee could not be said to be separate from the business that the assessee sought to enter into by purchasing the said tea estate. That being so, the interest on the loan that was taken for purchasing the tea estate and travelling and litigation expenses connected therewith must be held to be a revenue expenditure. Therefore the Tribunal was justified in allowing the interest payment, the court expenses and the travelling expenses incurred for acquiring the tea estate even though the transaction did not materialise. [In favour of the assessee] (Related Assessment year : 1969-70) – [CIT v. Abhoyjan Tea Estate (P) Ltd. (1977) 110 ITR 251 (Gauh.)]

Where Registrar of Companies was satisfied that affairs of assessee-company were mismanaged and, therefore, submitted a report to Government for investigating its affairs, legal expenses incurred in resisting appointment of a Government Inspector could not be regarded as expenses incurred for preserving its fair name and, hence, it was not a permissible deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act  

Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) - It is well settled that so far as expenses incurred in civil litigations are concerned the general tests are whether the legal expenses were incurred by the assessee in his character as a trader and the liability fell on him as a trader and whether the transaction in respect of which the proceedings are taken arose out of and was incidental to the assessee's business or profession.

As regards, the sum claimed as deduction for the legal expenses incurred in resisting the appointing of a Government inspector in report on the affairs of the assessee-company. It is clear that having regard to the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 the Registrar of Companies was satisfied that the affairs of the assessee were mismanaged and, therefore, submitted a report to the Government for investigating the affairs of the assessee-company. It was pursuant to this report that an investigator was appointed for investigating its affairs. Actually if the idea of the assessee was to preserve its fair name, then naturally it ought to have satisfied the investigator that its affairs were clean and tidy and no case existed for making an adverse report as regards the affairs of the company. Instead of adopting such a course the assessee started proceedings so as to prevent investigation of its affairs. Such proceedings could not be regarded as proceedings instituted for preserving the fair name of the assessee-company. On the contrary, the main underlying object of such proceeding was to save the skin of the persons who might have been guilty of acts of mismanagement of the affairs of the company. The expenses incurred for such litigation could not, therefore, be regarded as permissible deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of the 1922 Act. [In favour of revenue]  - [Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. CIT (1979) 117 ITR 945 (Bom.)]

I One of partners’ of assessee-firm, carrying on business of import and export of iron and steel, was prosecuted for contravening provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 but was subsequently acquitted - Assessee-firm claimed amount spent in defending its partner as business expenditure - Litigation expenditure in question was not wholly and exclusively for purpose of business of assessee-firm and fact that acquittal of partner was important for reputation of assessee-firm would not make said expenditure a permissible allowance under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act

Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) - An accused charged with an offence under section 4(3), read with section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, can be sentenced to undergo imprisonment which may extend to two years. The nature of charge in the criminal case against the partner was of a contravention alleged to have been personally committed by him and the object of spending money on his defence in that case was to save him from being sent to jail. It could not consequently, be said that the expenditure of Rs. 6,000 was wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee-firm. The fact that his acquittal was important for the reputation of the assessee-firm would not detract from the above conclusion. Therefore, the expenditure of Rs. 6,000 was not a permissible allowance under section 10(2)(xv ). [In favour of the revenue] (Related Assessment year : 1958-59) [CIT v. Chaman Lal and Bros (1970) 77 ITR 383 (Del.)]

The highest court of the land held that it could make no difference whether the proceedings were civil or criminal. All that the Court had to see was whether legal expenses were incurred by assessee in his character as trader, i.e., whether transaction, in respect of which proceedings were taken, arose out of and was incidental to business? Further, whether expenditure was bona fide and incurred wholly and exclusively for business ? - [CIT v. Dhanrajgirji Raja Narasingiriji AIR 1974 SC 1366 (1973) 91 ITR 544 : (1974) 3 SCC 520 (SC)]

Where on account of disputes amongst partners of assessee’s managing agency firms, inter se litigation was initiated by one partner against other and assessee-company was made a party to such litigation, assessee could not claim deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act in respect of expenses incurred in such litigation - Where one of partners of managing agency firm was appointed as Controller of assessee-company by Central Government which was challenged by another partner by a writ petition, expenses incurred by assessee-company in defending said appointment could not be claimed as deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act even if assessee had been arrayed as petitioner in that writ petition

Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - In the instant case, in regard to assessment year 1953-54, the Tribunal found inter alia, that the counsel for the two companies, including the assessee company, was JS whereas KLM was the counsel for KNK and RNK but law charges claimed and disallowed were mostly in respect of fees paid to KLM and his juniors. Even if there was a mistake in the records and the fees were really paid to the counsel for the assessee-company, the expenses were not deductible as there was no material on which it could be held that the company at any material time was faced with a situation which actually hampered the carrying on of its business or even that there was any such serious apprehended threat to the smooth working or management of the company's business as necessitated the expenditure of any sum by way of litigation expenses to secure the smooth working of the company and to prevent any hindrance or obstacle in the way of the smooth management of the company's business. Moreover, the finding recorded by the Tribunal on the basis of material on record was a finding of fact. On this finding no question of law could really arise as to whether the litigation expenses were covered by section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act. Under the circumstances the assessee-company was rightly held not to be entitled to any deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of the 1922 Act in the assessment year 1953-54.

As regards expenses for the assessment year 1954-55 incurred in connection with writ petition, there was nothing to show that any expenditure had been incurred for the protection of the assets of the company's business; much less, had it been shown that the expenditure was laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the company. In fact, as observed by the Tribunal, the litigations in reality were litigations arising out of disputes between the partners of the managing agency firms inter se. It was immaterial that the assessee-company had also been arrayed as a petitioner in the writ petition or that the assessee-company had incurred some expense in defending the appointment of KNK as authorised controller so long as it was not shown that such expenditure was necessary and had been incurred for the purpose of the company, that is, either for the safeguard of the company’s business assets or preventing or removing any hindrance or obstacle in the way of the smooth running of the company's business. There was no material on record to show this fact. Further in the writ petition before the Supreme Court the assessee-company being one of the petitioners, it would be incongruous to say that expenses for opposing the petition had to be provided by the company. There was nothing on the record to show that the company had objected to its being made a co-petitioner with ONK and had got itself transposed to the array of opposite parties. Nothing was also shown, as mentioned in the order of the Income-tax Officer, to establish that the company either in law or under the order by which KNK was appointed authorised controller was bound to meet the expenses for defending his appointment as authorised controller. Therefore, the expenditure could not be claimed deduction under section 10(2) (XV) of 1922 Act. [In favour of revenue] (Related Assessment years : 1953-54 and 1954-55) – [Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. CIT (1972) 86 ITR 635 (All.)]

TO disallowed expenses incurred by assessee-company for representing its case before Investigation Commission - Expenditure in prosecuting a civil proceeding cannot be denied as a permissible deduction if it is reasonably and honestly incurred to promote interest of business - To preserve business from an investigation which, according to assessee, was unlawful and from inroads of a piece of legislation which was unconstitutional and was so held by Supreme Court later in decisions, assessee was justified in taking proper steps and spending monies therefor - Therefore expenditure which was incurred by assessee in opposing a coercive Governmental action with object of saving taxation and safeguarding business was justified by commercial expendiency and was, therefore, allowable under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act

Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - For the assessment years 1952-53 to 1954-55, the assessee-company incurred expenses for representing its case before the Investigation Commission relating to past assessment years and claimed as deduction under section 10(2)(xv), or in the alternative, under section 10(1). The ITO disallowed the claim, and the disallowance was upheld by the Tribunal. On reference, the High Court was of the view that the proceeding before the Investigation Commission was not a civil proceeding; but it was a statutory proceeding with a view to collecting of materials for more taxation; therefore, if the proceeding touched the business of the assessee the expenditure incurred by the assessee in safeguarding its interest before the Commission would be an allowable deduction. It, therefore, held that the expenditure incurred by the assessee in opposing an illegal and coercive Government action with the object of saving taxation and safeguarding the business was justified by commercial expediency and was an allowable expenditure. On appeal to the Supreme Court :

Held : As a result of investigation into the affairs of the Birla group of concerns the case of the assessee was referred to the Commission while it was functioning for investigation. The assessee engaged eminent lawyers and incurred the expenses in question in conducting appropriate proceedings before the Commission as also in Courts where the vires of the aforesaid Investigation Commission Act were challenged. It is well-settled by now that the deductibility of expenditure incurred in prosecuting the civil proceedings to resist the enforcement of a measure, legislative or executive, which means restriction on the carrying on of a business or to obtain a declaration that the measure is invalid, would, if other conditions are satisfied, be admissible as a deduction under section 10(2)(xv). Deductibility of such expenditure does not depend on the final outcome of those proceedings. However wrong-headed, ill-advised, unduly optimistic or over-confident in his conviction the assessee might appear in the light of the ultimate decision, expenditure in prosecuting a civil proceeding cannot be denied as a permissible deduction if it is reasonably and honestly incurred to promote the interest of the business.

The essential test which has to be applied is whether the expenses were incurred for the preservation and protection of the assessee's business from any such process or proceedings which might have resulted in the reduction of its income and profits and whether the same were actually and honestly incurred. It was not possible to understand how the expenditure on the proceedings in respect of the Investigation Commission by the assessee would not fall within the above rule. Even otherwise, the expenditure was incidental to the business and was necessitated or justified by commercial expediency. The earning of profits and the payment of taxes are not isolated and independent activities of a business. These activities are continuous and take place from year to year during the whole period for which the business continues. If the assessee takes any steps for reducing its liability to tax which results in more funds being left for the purpose of carrying on the business there is always a possibility of higher profits.

The Commission was holding an investigation on a suspected escapement of income to the tune of about Rs. 4 crores. Taxes levied on that income and the penalties imposed would naturally have been very heavy for the business of the assessee and might have either crippled or annihilated it. To preserve the business from an investigation which, according to the assessee, was unlawful the assessee was justified in taking proper steps and spending monies therefor. Such an expenditure was no doubt for earning profits but was aimed at preservation of business from the inroads of a piece of legislation which, it was maintained, was unconstitutional and was so held by the Supreme Court later in certain decisions. The expenditure which was incurred by the assessee in opposing a coercive governmental action with the object of saving taxation and safeguarding business was justified by commercial expediency and was, therefore, allowable under section 10(2)(xv) Thus, the approach of the High Court and its ultimate decision were fully justified on principle and authority. The appeals were accordingly dismissed. [In favour of assessee] (Related Assessment years : 1952-53 to 1954-55) – [CIT, West Bengal v. Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. (1971) 82 ITR 166 (SC)]

Assessee took on lease from Government Murli Hills for purpose of quarrying limestone for a period of one year - Thereupon Government appointed assessee at its agent for working quarry with understanding that Murali Hills would be ultimately leased out to it - Meanwhile, ‘K’ on basis of leasehold rights granted to it initially filed a suit against Government for specific performance in which assessee was also impleaded as one of defendants - Suit was resisted by Government as well as assessee - Litigation expenses incurred by assessee on aforesaid suit were allowable under section 10(2)(xv) of 1961 Act

Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - The assessee-company took on lease from the Govt. the Murli Hills for the purpose of quarrying limestone for a period of one year. Thereafter, the Govt. appointed the assessee as its agent for working in the quarry with an understanding that the Murli Hills would be leased out to the assessee if the Govt. succeeded in the litigation against one ‘K’. ‘K’ on the basis of lease hold rights granted to it initially by the Govt., filed a suit against the Government and impleaded the assessee also as one of the defendants, and sought specific performance. Ultimately, the suit was decreed for damages and the assessee was also made liable for damages.

For the assessment year 1951-52, the ITO held that the litigation expenses were incurred for acquiring a new asset. Thus, said expenses being capital in nature, could not be allowed as deduction. The Tribunal, however, took the view that the expenditure was incurred to protect the assessee's business. It, accordingly, allowed the assessee’s claim. On reference, the High Court restored the ITO’s orders. On appeal to the Supreme Court :

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :

“Where litigation expenses are incurred by the assessee for the purpose of creating, curing or completing the assessees title to the capital, then the expenses incurred must be considered as capital expenditure. But if the litigation expenses are incurred to protect the business of the assessee, they must be considered as a revenue expenditure.”

From the facts, the only reasonable inference that could be drawn was that the assessee resisted the suit in order to protect its business and not with a view to safeguard its prospects of getting a new lease. At any rate, the view taken by the Tribunal on the facts before it that the assessee incurred the expenditure in question to protect its business interest could not be considered as an unreasonable view. In the instant case, the assessee did not initiate the proceedings. It merely defended the claim made against it. The claim was made against it because it was working the Murli Hills though as an agent of the Government. Therefore, the civil proceedings were launched against it because of one of its business activities. Under those circumstances, the High Court was not right in holding that the expenditure in question was not a revenue expenditure. [In favour of the assessee] (Related Assessment year : 1951-52) – [Dalmia Jain & Co. Ltd. v. CIT (1971) 81 ITR 754 (SC)]

Expenditure aimed at resisting measures imposing restrictions on trade is deductible, irrespective of final outcome

Expenditure incurred to resist in a civil proceeding the enforcement of a legislative or executive, measure which imposes restrictions on the carrying on of a business, or to obtain a declaration that the measure is invalid would, if other conditions are satisfied, be admissible, under section 37(1) as a permissible deduction in the computation of taxable income.

Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - Assessee-company was engaged in business of cotton spinning and weaving - It was distributing a part of yarn produced to weavers outside factory to weave said yarn into cloth - Provincial Textile Commissioner issued an order directing assessee-company to deliver yarn to certain notified categories of persons only - Against said order, assessee-company filed writ petition in High Court and got certain relief - Amount spent by assessee in aforesaid litigation was claimed as business expenditure - On facts, litigation expenses incurred by assessee-company were deductible under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of cotton spinning and weaving. In the premises of the factory of the company there were installed 80 handlooms. These handlooms were found inadequate to weave the yarn produced by the factory and a part of the yarn produced was distributed to weavers outside the factory who were engaged by the company to weave the yarn into cloth. Under clause 18B of the Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1945, issued by the Government of India, the Textile Commissioner was authorised to direct any manufacturer or dealer or any class of manufacturers or dealers, inter alia, not to sell or deliver any yarn or cloth of specified description except to such person or persons and subject to such conditions as the Textile Commissioner might specify. On 07.02.1946, the Textile Commissioner issued an order directing the company not to sell or deliver any yarn manufactured by the company except to such person or persons as the Textile Commissioner might specify. The company continued notwithstanding the prohibition to deliver yarn to weavers and did so till 20.02.1946. This yarn was seized under the orders of the Textile Commissioner. On 20.02.1946, the Provincial Textile Commissioner issued an order directing assessee-company to deliver yarn to certain notified categories of persons only. The assessee filed a writ in the High Court and got relief. The amount spent by the assessee in the litigation was claimed as business expenditure for the assessment years 1949-50 and 1950-51. The claims were rejected by the departmental authorities and by the Tribunal. On reference, the High Court also answered the question in favour of the revenue. On appeal to the Supreme Court :

Held : Under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act as amended, the expenditure even though not directly related to the earning of income may still be admissible as a deduction. Expenditure on civil litigation commenced or carried on by an assessee for protecting the business is admissible as expenditure under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act provided other conditions are fulfilled, even though the expenditure does not directly relate to the earning of income. Expenditure incurred not with a view to the direct and immediate benefit for purposes of commercial expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the business is, therefore, expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the trade.

The object of the petition filed by the assessee was to secure a declaration that the order dated 20-2-1946, in so far as it sought to put restrictions upon the right of the company to carry on its business in the manner in which it was accustomed to do was unauthorised and to prevent enforcement of that order; thereby the company was seeking to obtain an order from the Court enabling the business to be carried on without interference. Expenditure incurred in that behalf would without doubt be expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the company.

It was unfortunate that the High Court took the facts not from the statement of the case, but apparently from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The High Court assumed that the company had contravened the law because it delivered yarn to weavers in contravention of the order, dated 20.02.1946. But the assumption on which the discussion was founded was erroneous.

The High Court also thought that expenditure to fall within the terms of section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act must be one for the purpose of earning income, and there was no material on the record to show that the expenditure was so incurred. If it was intended thereby to imply that the primary motive in incurring the expenditure admissible to deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act must be directly to earn income thereby, the Court with respect unable to agree with that view.

Expenditure incurred to resist in a civil proceedings the enforcement of a measure-legislative or executive-which imposes restrictions on the carrying on of a business, or to obtain a declaration that the measure is invalid would, if other conditions are satisfied, be admissible, under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act as a permissible deduction in the computation of taxable income. The appeals were to be allowed accordingly. [In favour of the assessee] (Related Assessment years : 1949-50 and 1950-51) - [Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. CIT (1967) 63 ITR 207 (SC)]

A foreign concern filed a suit against assessee alleging repudiation of contract by assessee in relation to supply of moulds – Court allowed suit of foreign concern and awarded damages of certain sum along with costs – Litigation expenses incurred by assessee in that suit was claimed as revenue expenditure allowable under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act – Since litigation arose in course of proceedings for acquisition of capital asset, these litigation expenses were not expenditure allowable under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act

Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - In this case, it is clearly stated in the statement of the case that the transaction between the United Kindgom company and the assessee related to purchase of moulds which were being acquired in the nature of capital assets. It is to be noted that the litigation occurred while the process of acquiring those moulds was still going on. There had been correspondence between the parties and, according to the United Kingdom company, some moulds were supplied to the assessee and the assessee wrongly refused to accept those moulds and committed breach of contract. Ultimately, the matter was settled by a compromise under which the assessee did acquire moulds of the value of £ 6,000 and that was the capital asset finally acquired by the assessee. In these circumstances, it is clear that all the litigation expenses that were incurred by the assessee were incurred in the course of the acquisition of these moulds as capital assets. The expenditure was not incurred after the acquisition of those moulds as capital assets and was not for the protection of capital assets which might have already been acquired by the assessee-company. The expenditure having been incurred in the course of acquisition of capital assets it must be held to be expenditure of a capital nature. The cases that have been brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the assessee only deal with the aspect where litigation expenses have been incurred for protection of capital assets which already existed in the hands of the assessee or had already been acquired by the assessee. In those, it has been held that litigation expenses incurred for the protection of capital assets were a legitimate charge as revenue expenditure. The facts of the case before us are quite different. Here no capital assets had been acquired when these litigation expenses were incurred. The litigation arose in the course of the proceedings for acquisition of the capital assets. In these circumstances we have no hesitation in holding that these litigation expenses were not expenditure “allowable” under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act, being expenses of a capital nature.  [In favour of revenue] – [Plastic Products Ltd. v. CIT (1966) 62 ITR 209 (All.)]

Assessee, a partner in a firm, filed suit against other partners for rendition of account and incurred litigationexpenses - Tribunal held that litigation expenditure was not incurred wholly and exclusively for purposes of assessee’s business activities - On aforesaid finding recorded by Tribunal, said amount could not come under provisions of section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act

Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) - The assessee was a partner of a firm. He filed a suit against certain partners of the firm for rendition of accounts. The question was whether the amount of on spent on litigation was an expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. The Tribunal held that the expenditure was not incurred for the purposes of the activities of the business but to enforce a right against a partner which, according to the Tribunal, was quite a different thing and was, therefore, not allowable as an admissible business expenditure. On reference :

Held : On the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the amount was not laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business, it could not come under the provisions of section 10(2)(xv) of the 1922 Act. Thus, the litigation expenses did not represent admissible business expenditure. (Related Assessment year : 1945-46) – [Raghunath Prasad v. CIT (1955) 28 ITR 45 (All.)]

Assessee carrying on business as selling agents of certain company, was prosecuted under Hoarding and Profiteering Cordinance, 1943, on charge of selling goods at prices higher than that were reasonable in contravention of provisions of section 6 thereof - Assessee defended case and incurred certain expenditure - He claimed deduction in respect of said expenditure under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act - Amount spent in defending criminal proceeding was not expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for purpose of business as contemplated by section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act, therefore, assessee’s claim was to be disallowed

Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] - The finding of the Tribunal was vitiated by its refusal to consider the possibility of the criminal proceeding terminating in the conviction and imprisonment of the assessee. The assessee was prosecuted under section 13 of 1943 ordinance and was charged with contravention of section 6, which by sub-section (1) prohibits the sale by a dealer or producer of an article for a consideration which is unreasonable and sub section (2) defines “unreasonable consideration”. The framers of the Ordinance thus appeared to have regarded the offence as one calling for a deterrent punishment in view of its anti-social character, and it is idle to suggest that it is for the income-tax authorities to prove in such cases that the conviction might result in a sentence of imprisonment and that, in the absence of such proof, there was, at the most, only a chance of conviction and fine. If, in every criminal prosecution where the matter is defended to protect the good name of a business or a professional man, the fear of possible fine or imprisonment must always be there, it must ordinarily be difficult for any Court to say, that the expenses incurred for the defence, even if they are not to be regarded as the "personal expenses" of the person accused, constituted “expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business”.

The deductibility of such expenses under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act must depend on the nature and purpose of the legal proceeding in relation to the business whose profits are under computation, and cannot be affected by the final outcome of the proceeding. Income-tax assessments have to be made for ever year and cannot be held up until the final result of a legal proceeding, which may pass through several Courts, is announced.

It was, therefore, held that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the sum spent in defending the criminal proceeding was an expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business as contemplated by section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act. [In favour of the revenue] (Related Assessment year : 1945-46) – [CIT v. H. Hirjee (1953) 23 ITR 427 (SC)]

Assessee was money-lender – It took mortgages from a person who was subsequently adjudged insolvent – On a suit filed by receiver, Court held mortgages to be void – It further held that mortgages were taken with object of preserving a portion of property for assessee’s relation – Assessee claimed that litigation expenses incurred in aforesaid proceeding be allowed as deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act – On facts, it could be concluded that litigation expenses were not expended wholly and exclusively for purpose of assessee’s business under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act, therefore, assessee’s claim was to be rejected

Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] – The assessee was a money-lender. He took from one ‘U’ four mortgages of the aggregate value of Rs. 1 lakh. Three of these mortgages were for Rs. 20,000 each and the fourth one was for Rs. 40,000. On an application by a creditor, ‘U’ was adjudged an insolvent. The receiver appointed by the Court filed a suit under sections 53 and 54 of the Provincial Insolvency Act for annulment of the four mortgages on various grounds. The Court ultimately held that the four mortgages were void. The Court further held that the intention was that since ‘U’ was going to be ruined, as much of his property as could be saved might be saved for his cousin. The Court further came to the conclusion that only Rs. 15,000 was the money out of Rs. 1,00,000 which had come out of the stock-in-trade of the assessee, while Rs. 16,000 was not a money-lending advance but was a deposit with the insolvent debtor for meeting the expenses of marriage of a female relation of the assessee. The assessee had spent a sum of Rs. 9,070 in defending his title on the basis of these four mortgages in the suit brought against him by the receiver. He claimed this amount as an admissible deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act. The ITO rejected the assessee's claim. On appeals, the AAC and, the Tribunal upheld the ITO’s order. On reference :

The assessee entered into four mortgage transactions not in the course of his money-lending business but with the object of preserving a portion of the property for his relation and on that finding of fact it could not be held that the expenditure was wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business of the assessee. It could not be said that the assessee got these mortgages executed in his favour in the course of his money-lending business and that they were not foreign to that business. The expenditure incurred to be an admissible deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of 1922 Act, must be an expenditure wholly and exclusively for the purpose of such business. It could not be said that the sum in question was spent wholly and exclusively for the purpose of such business, nor did the assessee claim any right of apportionment. In such circumstances, the assessee’s claim was to be disallowed. [In favour of revenue] (Related Assessment year : 1942-43) – [Seth Kaluram Kankaria, In re (1947) 15 ITR 209 (All.)]

For purpose of his business, assessee purchased a building which was used as godown for storage of goods – A suit for pre-emption of this property was filed against assessee who had to spend certain amount in defending that suit – Litigation expenses incurred by assesse did not result in acquisition, improvement or alternation of capital asset, and, therefore, expenditure incurred by assessee was not capital expenditure but allowable revenue expenditure under section 10(2)(xii) of 1922 Act

Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 – The assessee was plumber and a dealer in cement and sanitary goods and fittings. For purpose of his business he purchased a building which was used as a godown for the storage of his goods. Thereafter, a suit for pre-emption of this property was instituted against the assessee who had to spend certain amount in the prevision year 1940-41 in defending that suit. The suit was dismissed but an appeal from the decree was pending in the court. In his return of income for the assessment year 1941-42, the assessee claimed to deduct that sum as a business expense under section 10(2)(xii) of the 1922 Act. The ITO, however, disallowed the same. The AAC and the Tribunal also confirmed the said disallowance on the ground that it was an expenditure of a capital nature. On reference, the Division Bench of the High Court having divergent view on the point as to whether the expenditure on defending the suit for pre-emption was or was not in the nature of capital expenditure, referred the question to the Full Bench.

Held : The question whether legal expenses are in a particular case capital or revenue expenditure should be decided according to the test suggested by Lord Cave and subsequently approved in a large number of cases, in particular by Lawrence, J., whether the expenses were incurred in acquiring a new capital asset or in improving or altering an existing capital asset. In the instant case, the asset to defend for which the expenditure was incurred was an existing asset and was not acquired in consequence of the expenditure. Nor was there any improvement or alteration made in that asset because the attack on the capital asset was successfully repelled. In view of the decree of the civil court dismissing the suit for pre-emption, it must be held that the attack on the assessee’s title to the asset was unfounded and no improvement in the title was effected by the dismissal of the suit. There was no analogy between the instant case and the case assumed because exhypothesi in the latter case the asessee purchased the property with knowledge of defect in the title, and perfected it by further payment. He, therefore, improved his asset and the expenditure was capital even according to the test laid down by Lawrence, J. The same would be the case where the assessee knowingly takes an imperfect title and subsequently makes it good by compromising with the party entitled to object to the sale. In the instant case, however, there was neither any acquisition nor any improvement nor any alteration in the capital asset.

The title of a purchaser may be attacked on several grounds and the right to pre-empt is only one of them. The essential point is that the plaintiff of the pre-emption suit sought to dispossess the assessee from his business premises, and the grounds on which he sought to dispossess him are wholly immaterial, the eventual decision being in favour of the assessee. The expenditure has so far been incurred only once but there was no guarantee that it may not recur, though it was not likely to recur in connection with a suit for pre-emption. It is as necessary for a business man to protect his business premises as his stock-in-trade, and there can not be any distinction in principle between litigation expenses incurred to defend the business premises and those incurred to defend the stock-in-trade. Both are incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business and do not result in the acquisition, improvement or alteration of a capital asset. For these reasons, expenditure incurred was a revenue expenditure and not a capital expenditure. [In favour of the assessee] (Related Assessment year : 1941-42) – [Mahabir Parshad and Sons v. CIT (1945) 13 ITR 340 (Lahore)]

Litigation expenditure incurred during accounting year for recovery of previous dues was an allowable deduction in law in computing profits of accounting year – Assessee running money lending business entered into a partnership with one ‘S’ and became financing partner for implementing a contract – Partnership dissolved and as per agreement amount due to assessee was to be paid by new financing partner of ‘S’ – Dues were not paid – Assessee incurred litigation expenses for realising it – Since assessee was still carrying on business of money lending, deduction of litigation expenses could not be denied on ground that said expenditure was related to business of same earlier years as money spend was necessary to recover an investment attended with same profits

Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] – The assessee was entitled to succeed. It was not disputed that that amount was incurred as litigation expense in the previous year, that it was spent to realise the capital invested in the business of the assessee as a money-lender and to realise some profits also which had accrued to the assessee in that money-lending business and which were agreed to be paid to him by successor of the partnership. If the assessee had not shown any profits from that business to the Income-tax Department in. the year in which the profits were earned, he may have escaped from taxation but that is no ground whatsoever for disallowing him this business expenditure.

Upon the termination of the business connection with ‘S’ money fell due to him was composed principally of the capital. However, it also contained some profits which had accrued to him either by way of interest or otherwise. The assessee was a money-lender and was entitled to set off against the profits of the previous year any expenses which he incurred in that business in the previous year. It was not correct to say that he was entitled to litigation expenses only if the partnership had been dissolved in the previous year. The finding that the claim was not in respect of any business carried on by the assessee during the previous year was erroneous in law because it was admitted that the assessee was carrying on money-lending business in the previous year. Now if the assessee was carrying business, the fact that the expenditure incurred in the previous year referred to business which was carried on in some earlier years made no difference at all. The Appellate Tribunal was not right when it said that this was not one of the many transactions of the same sort and that the money spent in realising the investment could not be said to have been spent to protect his stock-in-trade because it was clear that the money spent was necessary in order to recover an investment attended with some profits which had been made by the assessee in some earlier years. For those reasons it was held that in the circumstances of the case the litigation expenses were an allowable deduction in computing the profits of the assessee in the accounting year. [In favour of the assessee]. – [Jutharam Jankidas v. CIT (1944) 12 ITR 344 (Pat.)]

Assessee carried on money-lending business – He advanced a loan to a company in which he was a shareholder – A suit was filed against assessee alleging that said advance was made as a part of promise to finance said company which assessee failed to implement – Suit was ultimately dismissed – Assessee claimed deduction of expenses incurred in defending suit – Since expenditure in question was incurred solely for purpose of earning profits or gains of money-lending business, assessee was entitled to deduction claimed

Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [Corresponding to section 10(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922] – The father of the respondent-assessee carried on money lending business. He had advanced a loan to a company in which he was a shareholder. A suit for recovery of damages was filed by the other shareholder against the father alleging that he failed to implement his promises to finance the company as a part of which he had made said advance. During the pendency of the suit, the father died on 03.07.1929, and the respondent who continued the money lending business and his brother were substituted for their father. The suit was dismissed by the Court, in February 1931. For the assessment year 1931-32 the assessee claimed deduction of the litigation expenditure in defending the aforesaid case. The ITO disallowed the assessee’s claim. On appeal, the Assistant Commissioner upheld the disallowance. However, on reference, the High Court allowed the assessee’s claim. On appeal to the Privy Council :

In the instant case the loan already advanced was part of the promises made in the alleged agreement under which the father was to finance the company. The allegations of fraud, conspiracy, etc., were merely the extravagant embroidery which is commonly found in such actions ; they did not alter the main character of the action as being directed against the deceased as the money-lender, and the latter’s defence to the action was just as essential for the full protection of his rights as the creditor in the loan as was his suit for the recovery of the loan. It had to be remembered that money is the stock in trade of a money-lender. The appellant might well have come to a different conclusion, if he had realised the close connection of this loan with the transactions alleged in the suit. The alleged transaction was not foreign to the money lending business of the respondent and his father. Therefore, the facts stated by the Commissioner could not justify the opinion expressed by him, but that the expenditure in question was incurred solely for the purpose of earning the profits or gains of the money-lending business, and that the High Court was right in holding that the respondent was entitled to the deduction claimed. [In favour of the assessee] (Related Assessment year : 1931-32) – [CIT v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh (1942) 10 ITR 214 (PC)]

 

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